REMARKS

UPON

Dr. *HARE*'s Four Letters

TO A

Toxy Member,

CONCERNING

The Management of the WAR, &c.

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Tacit. Annal. lib. 1.

Totius injuſtitiæ nulla capitalior eſt quam eorum, qui cum maxime fallunt, id tamen agunt ut viri boni eſſe videantur.

Cicero.

LONDON
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Price 1 *s.*

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My Lord,

THE Honour your Lordſhip has been pleas'd to confer on a Perſon ſo little deſerving as my ſelf, in ſending me the two Letters to a *Tory* Member, concerning the *Management of the War*, and your Commands to return my Sentiments upon them, are Obligations not to be diſpens'd with, but in Juſtice requiring a ready Compliance. I am very ſenſible how improper it is for Men of my Function to ſet up for Judges of Martial and Political Affairs, to which we are not only ſuppos'd, but ought to be Strangers; for thoſe who have taken upon them the Charge of Souls and Spiritual Concerns, have more than enough to employ their Time, if they attend to their own Province, without aſſuming to themſelves to play the Generals and Stateſmen. It is much more commendable in a Clergyman to employ the Preſs in printing Rules for a Chriſtian Life, than in deſcribing the Management of War; and it were more agreeable to their Character, to ſhame Men out of their Vices, than to endeavour to puff them up with the Applauſe of their good Actions. Nothing can be more Diſagreeable, than to hear thoſe, who are the Miniſters of the Prince of Peace, ſounding a Trumpet to perpe-

tuate a War. The Zeal for the Houſe of God is loſt in the hot Purſuit of raiſing our own Houſes; and were that done in the proper Way of preaching up Piety, and declaiming againſt Vice, the Ambition, tho' evil in it ſelf, would ſtill be the better palliated, and more tolerable in the Eyes of the World; but to forget our Profeſſion, and only Study to make our Fortunes by writing of Politicks, by promoting Deſolation, and by Flattering the great Ones, is unpardonable. I know not what elſe the Author of *The Management of the War* can intend, by his Letters, ſo full of all thoſe Three Particulars, ſo much misbecoming his Character. None will deny him to be a Perſon of Learning and Intelligence; nor is it leſs notorious, that he miſapplies thoſe natural and acquir'd Endowments he is adorn'd with; for the Means he makes uſe of to graſp at a Miter, are more proper to recommend him to a Commiſſion in the Army, or a Seat in Council. Nay, I underſtand, he is ſo fond of his Productions, finding them inſcrib'd the Second and Third Editions, That what at firſt he recommended as a Secret to the Publiſher, he takes all Occaſions to reveal himſelf, that is, to own and declare himſelf the Author of thoſe admir'd Letters. I may be charg'd my ſelf as partly guilty of the Fault I lay to him, of medling with what does not concern me, to which your Lordſhip's Commands ſhall be my Excuſe; as alſo, that theſe curſory Remarks are not intended for publick View, nor my Name ever deſign'd to be expos'd,

ſhould

ſhould they prove ſo unfortunate as to take Air.. They may ſerve, as the *Manager* ſays of *The Letter to the Examiner*, to entertain, not to inform, your Lordſhip.

I had no leſs Difficulty to prevail with my ſelf to run over ſo much Fawning as is found in theſe Letters, than their Author had to peruſe the Bundle of Scandal ſent him. Flattery is as loathſome, as Scandal is diſhononourable, or Un-chriſtian. Yet that great Man prevail'd with himſelf in Obedience to his Friends commands to read, and give his Thoughts; the ſame muſt I do in Compliance to ſo Noble an Injunction. I ſhall however avoid Prolixity, as well in regard that my Duty calls me another Way, as to ſhun giving Offence to the Perſon I would principally endeavour to pleaſe. I am not ingag'd in any Party, looking upon all Diviſions as the greateſt Calamity of a Nation, whoſe true Welfare I more heartily wiſh than any of thoſe can do, who, by encouraging of Factions, only aim at raiſing themſelves upon the Ruins of others; and, as it is not my Part to Flatter the Great, which is never done out of any ſincere Affection, but in Hopes of the Reward, which uſually attends that mean tickling of their Ears; ſo would it much leſs become me to derogate the leaſt from the Honour of thoſe, who have Immortaliz'd themſelves by their Actions; and particularly, that renowned General, whom I am of Opinion, no Man ſo much reflects upon as the Letter-Writer, ſince he applies to him whatſoever he finds ſaid amiſs in others; and, what is worſe,

worſe, can judge him capable of being pleas'd with ſo much Fawning.

Now to come to the Letters: With what an Air of Authority do the 1ſt, 2d, and 3d Pages paſs a definitive Sentence on the Bundle of Papers: *The Letter to the Examiner is a pretty ſmart Performance, it has ſome Fire and Imagination, but no Reaſoning, Judgment or Experience:* An excellent Character, a ſmart Performance without Judgment; as much to the purpoſe, as if he had ſaid, A brave Soldier without Courage. *Arlus* and *Odolphus* has found more Favour, and is admitted *a tolerable Romance*, and yet that Piece has much more Scandal than the former. Poor *Sir* Thomas, *is dull, tedious, ſtupid, unnatural, ungrateful, and ſenſeleſs*: What more could be ſaid? And yet we ſhall ſee this goodly *Cenſor* has ſharper Epithets to beſtow on thoſe whoſe Writings fall under his Diſpleaſure. The *Letter from a Foreign Miniſter is the moſt artful Performance, and ſeems to be the Work of the chief Operator, having ſome quick and crafty Turns, and an affected Appearance of Fairneſs, with which he gilds over the blackeſt Poiſon of Malice and Invention.* Let the World judge, whether here be not Scandal in the higheſt Degree, and that not upon a poor Pamphleteer, but a Miniſter of State, who is thus induſtriouſly expos'd in the moſt contemptible Manner; and yet, what is the Crime laid to his Charge, but that he would pleaſe his Friends, take off Enemies, amuſe and quiet all, who are not acquainted with

with Affairs, nor enter into Parties. What more could be ſaid to his Honour, than what is here charg'd upon him as an Offence? Nothing certainly can be more commendable in a Miniſter than to encourage Friends, to take off Enemies, and to quiet All, that have not liſted themſelves in Factions, who are generally the beſt Friends to the State, whilſt Party-Men are only fond of themſelves. *Faults on both Sides, has common Senſe*; and this is a particular Mark of Grace, becauſe under that falſe Title it lays all the Faults to one Side; and yet nevertheleſs, his Cauſe obliges him to quit it, when he ſpeaks of Credit; and *the Eſſay upon that Subject is a moſt affected myſterious Piece of Nonſenſe.* Now what can be more ridiculouſly Nonſenſical, than for one Paper to be good common Senſe, and yet to be oblig'd to quit it; and another to be Nonſenſe, and at the ſame time myſterious? All theſe Papers, ſuch as repreſented, are charg'd upon the above-mentioned Miniſter; who, *Pag.* 4. is digniſied with the Title of *Poſture-Maſter in Politicks*, and compar'd to a *Pedler with a Raree-Show*, acting all the Parts of the Puppets himſelf, and impoſing upon Foreigners. A noble Deſcription of a Miniſter, and no leſs Compliment upon the Allies, who this Writer would perſuade us are to be deluded by Puppet-Shows and Legerdemain. But then comes in the old cry of *Popery and France*, which he tells us *thoſe Men that are diſgrac'd did not favour*: He very well knows no Man has ever laid it to their Charge, or does

imagine it of them; and therefore can only urge it to inſinuate, that thoſe who have ſucceeded them are ſo inclin'd. This, he is not ignorant, was the cry, that brought one Monarch to the Block; and cannot queſtion, but the ſame may expoſe the Miniſters of another to the Danger of as unhappy an End.

Pag. 5. The ſubject of this Letter is diſtributed under Four Heads, as if it were a Sermon; and if the Author's Talent be no better at Preaching than Politicks, it is a great Misfortune he ſhould wear the Gown. A Word to each of theſe Points, without Marſhalling of them in this Place. The Firſt is the Controverſie, Whether a good Peace might have been had at the End of the *Ramellies* Campaign, or not; and, whether it ought to have been accepted of, or no. This indeed, is a Point, I think, the *Letter-Writer* had as little right to controvert as my ſelf. The Power of Peace and War, as I take it, is veſted in the Crown; and the Prince, upon ſuch important Occaſions, generally adviſes with the Council; and yet every inconſiderable Subject takes upon him, not only to adviſe, but to direct what Peace is to be made, and how long the War is to be proſecuted. I ſhall not preſume to intrude my ſelf ſo far into the Government, as to argue this Point; but let us take a Note of ſome few of this Author's Notions. *Pag.* 6. he tells us, *That without the Reſtitution of the* Spaniſh *Monarchy to the Houſe of* Auſtria, *and the procuring of a good Barrier againſt* France

on

on the ſide of the Netherlands, *there can be no Security for* Great Britain, *that their Trade, Religion and Government, will not be loſt*, &c. This ſhows how mean a Conceit this Man has of the Maritime Power of *England*, which has ever been its Defence againſt all Foreign Enemies; and how groundleſs an Idea he frames to himſelf of the Power of *France*'s being increas'd by the Acceſſion of *Spain*, as if that Monarchy were to be united to his; which being veſted in the ſecond of his Grandſons, will be ever as Independant as before; and when the Duke of *Burgundy* comes to the Crown, it is well known that no Ties of Conſanguinity are of Force to unite thoſe whom ſeparate Intereſts of State divide.

Herodian, in the Life of *Septimus Severus* tell us, That Emperor made a Law, prohibiting all Perſons from medling with other Men's Profeſſions, and enjoyning every one to Practice that in which he had been brought up. How happy were it to have ſuch a Law among us, who are generally ſo fond of having an Oar in every Man's Boat, and neglecting our own. It is the Part of Monarchs to govern, of Parliaments to preſcribe Laws, of Generals to command Armies, of Clergymen to Preach and Pray, and of Subjects in general to Obey; and yet we daily ſee, all Order inverted, the Laity pretending to direct the Church, and the Clergy aſpiring to Rule the State.

To proceed with the First Letter: At *Pag.* 6. it takes in hand *to decide* what a good Peace is, and what ought to be accepted and rejected. I will not be guilty of the like Presumption, nor aspire to Seat my self at the Helm of Government, but shall only observe how modest and pertinently this Sovereign *Dictator* sums up the Evidence, and passes Judgment. We are told, *We went into the War to obtain these two Ends, the Restitution of the* Spanish *Monarchy to the House of* Austria, *and the procuring a good Barrier against* France *on the side of the* Netherlands; and then, *Pag.* 8. *To have been content with a Moiety of that we went into the War for, would have render'd us inexcusable to all Posterity.* Thus to abate one Tittle of our first Demands is an unpardonable Crime; and yet, but a few Years before, we were satisfied with that very Alternative this Gentleman is so heinously offended at, and the Treaty of Partition was concluded by some of those worthy Persons he would seem so violently to espouse. Besides, here is no Allowance for the Chance of War, or the Decrees of Providence, but because so much was demanded, so much must positively be had, or else we are never to be forgiven. And indeed, no wonder he should be so positive, and so well acquainted with Futurity, who can dive into the Hearts of Men, and tell us what they would have said, *viz. That some Body had been well paid for such a Peace, and nothing less than his Head would have atton'd for it.* A wonderful Prediction! The

Thoughts

Thoughts of Men are foreſeen, and the Danger of a Head falling a Sacrifice to Peace foretold.

What an immenſe Loſs is it to the Government, that this Man ſhould not be at the Helm, whoſe wonderful Sagacity dives into all Events at ſuch a Diſtance: And accordingly, *Pag.* 9. he goes on to ſhow us, *What to every Body is not ſo plain; and that is, That the* French *were not ſincere.* Spoke like an Oracle! For moſt infallible it is, that every Body knew not whether the *French* were ſincere or not; nor indeed do I ſee how they ſhould, without the Spirit of Propheſie, which every Man is not endow'd with, in ſo great a Proportion as the *Letter-Writer*, who does not only know that the *French* were not ſincere, but exactly what the Emperor, what the *Dutch*, and what every Confederate would have made Choice of. Thus much by Way of Prediction; now for Politicks. *A Man muſt be blind not to ſee, that the Part the Emperor would like beſt to have, the ſame* France *would like beſt to part with.* Nothing can be more abſurd than this Aſſertion; for it is moſt apparent, the Emperor would make Choice of what was moſt for his Conveniency, and would prove the greateſt Addition to his Power; and for thoſe very Reaſons, *France* muſt of Neceſſity be moſt averſe to his Demands, unleſs we will ſuppoſe the *French* no better Stateſmen than this Author.

Pag.

Pag. 10. The King of *Sweden*, tho' no declar'd Enemy, finds no better Quarter than if he were an Infidel, and that of the meaneſt Rank; for he is brought in *inſulting the* Imperial *Dignity in an outragious Manner.* This Language indeed looks more like an Outrage againſt his *Swediſh* Majeſty, from one ſo far beneath him, than all that he a Sovereign Monarch ever pretended to Act againſt another.

It muſt indeed be allow'd, That *they are vile Impoſtors*, who, as we are told, *Pag.* 11. *Would perſuade us, That half the* Spaniſh *Monarchy is as good as the whole, and that nothing is as good as half:* No Man will certainly deny, but that this muſt be a great Piece of *Impudence of the State-Mountebanks, who would have perſuaded us, that we were dangerouſly ill, when we ſaw and felt our ſelves very well.* I cannot be perſuaded any Man will think the offer of the *French* ſo ridiculous, as this Senſeleſs way of arguing, infallibly deſign'd to delude ignorant Zealots with a pretty jingle of Words.

Let us paſs by the far fetch'd Notion, *Pag.* 12. That the treating with the *French* at that Time occaſion'd the Loſs of the Battel of *Almanza*; by which Rule, we may as well infer, That becauſe there was another Treaty at *Gertruydenberg* this laſt Year, therefore the Confederates have again been unſucceſsful in *Spain.* Theſe profound Speculations are too tedious to take Notice of, and therefore I paſs on to Fact; as to which, *Pag.* 14. ſays, *Tho' the Battel* (*of* Almanza) *was fought in* April, *and our Army*

my was in a Manner ruin'd by that Blow, all they (the Spaniards) *did that Year, was only to take* Lerida. This Falſhood from an ignorant Perſon, who had never ſeen a Map of *Spain*, might have paſs'd unregarded; but from one, who, as ſo great a Stateſman and Soldier, ought to know all Countries, it is too groſs an Impoſition not to be taken notice of: For at this rate, the entire Kingdom of *Valencia*, and all that of *Aragon*, except ſome ſmall mountainous Places, muſt ſtand for nothing, or not be of any Note, when compar'd with *Lerida*; and it is well known, both thoſe Kingdoms, which had before own'd King *Charles*, were again reduc'd under the Obedience of King *Philip*. However, *Almanza* was not the only ill Conſequence of treating at that Time with *France*; that very Treaty we muſt believe diſappointed the Project on *Thoulon*: For *Pag.* 15. aſſures us, *This is all plain naked Truth and Fact, which theſe Writers, or thoſe at leaſt that Dictate to them, know as certainly, as they do, that two and two make four; and if they have any Modeſty, they will bluſh when you let them ſee their Inventions thus expoſed.* I cannot perceive what thoſe Writers here mention'd are neceſſitated now to Bluſh at, if the Fact and Truth be ſo plain and naked, all the World muſt have ſpy'd it before, without the Help of this wonderful Diſcovery; or if none could ſee it without the Light of this Letter, then was it not ſo plain and naked as we are inform'd; but if few can ſtill ſubſcribe to this Myſtery, without blindly ſubmitting their Judgment

to

to the *Manager's Ipse dixit*, it is evident the want of Modesty must be retorted on himself, for endeavouring to impose such Incongruities upon Mankind.

But to make out all he has said before, at *Pag.* 16. he gives us the King of *France's* Letter to the Pope, which he says, is *one plain Authentick Proof, as good as a thousand Demonstrations.* The Purport of the Letter is, *That the King has nothing more at Heart than to second the Pope's Endeavoars for a Peace; That it was not his Fault that the War was begun, and he would seek all Occasions to end it; That he had made Proposals to the Emperor in the midst of his Successes, and still preserv'd the same Ideas of Peace after his Losses: That to the end his Enemies might have no Pretence to impute to him the loss of so much Christian Blood, he offer'd the Emperor, the* Milaneſe, Naples *and* Sicily, *and a Barrier to the* Dutch, *&c.* This is given us for *an Authentick Proof, as good as a thousand Demonstrations*; and yet the best Authority we have for it is the *Mercure Historique & Politique*, a Pamphlet, as much to be relied on as the Letter that quotes it, and still according to its Phrase, *as good as a thousand Demonstrations.* One Demonstration among all rational Creatures is full Conviction; then how can this Letter, which no Man is assur'd is genuine, be equal to a thousand. However, supposing it to be ever so Authentick, to what Purpose is it brought in here, or what does it evince. If it be to prove the Offer made by the *French* to the Emperor, and the

Dutch,

Dutch, no Man conteſts it, and to prove what is not controverted is Labour loſt. If to ſhew the Inſincerity of the *French*, nothing can be more Prepoſterous, for we have nothing in it but Proteſtations of an earneſt Deſire for Peace, and thoſe made to a third Perſon no way concern'd in the Quarrel; and what Inference of Inſincerity can be drawn from them, the World is at liberty to Believe or Disbelieve; but to conclude abſolutely by the Rules of Contraries is no Proof or Demonſtratiun. Thus, we ſee, this Gentleman, as he ſays, of *the Letter to the Examiner*, has nothing of Reaſoning; and his Letter, according to his Phraſe upon the Eſſay, is nothing but myſterious Nonſenſe.

We come now to the Second Point; Pag. 19. *That the War in* Spain *has been ſhamefully neglected, tho' the Recovery of that Kingdom was the chief Thing we propos'd by entring into the War.* This the Letter allows to be the moſt plauſible of all the Complaints, and yet undertakes to make out it has, if poſſible, leſs Senſe in it than any of the reſt; which is the ſubject Matter of all the reſt of it, leaving the two other Points to the Second Letter. I ſhall as little take upon me to judge of this Management, as I did before of the reaſonableneſs of making Peace, or continuing the War, both the one and the other being equally above that Manager's Sphere and mine; but ſince, with ſuch Authority, he decides that Controverſie, and poſitively declares there was no Neglect or Miſ-

management, I will Anſwer him with *The Humble Repreſentation of the Right Honourable the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, preſented to Her Majeſty, on Saturday, the 10th Day of* February, 1710. To inſert it all were needleſs, and tedious, I ſhall therefore only quote a few Lines out of it which are home to the purpoſe. Their Lordſhips having perus'd the Papers laid before them by Her Majeſties Order, and examin'd ſeveral Perſons relating to the Affairs of *Spain*, in the firſt Paragraph of the aforeſaid Repreſentation, after the Preamble, have theſe Words; *We have been enabled to diſcover ſome of thoſe many Miſcarriages which have diſappointed the Hopes Your Majeſty and all* Europe *juſtly conceiv'd from the Reſolutions of your Parliaments.* Here we have ſome of many Miſcarriages diſcover'd. Then, Paragraph Second, *We are aſtoniſh'd to find, That any employ'd by your Majeſty, ſhould contribute to the Diſappointment of ſo glorious a Deſign, or ſo much as neglect to promote it.* Here is neglecting and contributing to Diſappoint, to make out which it goes on.

We were extreamly ſurpriz'd to find, by all the Accounts now before us, That of the 29395 *Men given by Parliament for the Service of the War in* Spain, *there ſhould be preſent in* Spain *at the Time of the Battle of* Almanza *only* 13759. Then clearing the Earl of *Galway* in Part of that Blame, their Lordſhips proceed,

For

For whatever Defects there have been, thoſe are moſt of them juſtly to be imputed to thoſe who had the Management of Your Majeſties Affairs here, &c. Then a little lower,

And upon Conſideration of the other Deficiencies, we have found Reaſon to Reſolve,

That by not ſupplying the Deficiencies of the Men given by Parliament for the War in Spain, *the Miniſters have greatly neglected that Service, which was of the greateſt Importance.*

And yet Negligence, and the Profuſion of vaſt Sums of Money given by Parliament, are not the only Faults we have to lay before Your Majeſty. We beg leave to add, That unaccountable Advice given at Valencia, *for an offenſive War at that Time in* Spain, *and approv'd of here,* &c.

Your Lordſhip is left to your liberty to chooſe whom to Credit, either the *Manager*, affirming and endeavouring to prove, upon his own Imaginations, Surmiſes, and extravagant Arguments, that there was no Neglect or Miſmanagement of the Affairs of *Spain*, or your own Right Honourable Houſe, which upon mature Deliberation, and a full Examination of Authentick Vouchers, and credible Witneſſes, has ſo ſolemnly declar'd the contrary. I know not whether that Writer can bluſh, but am ſure he has Cauſe enough, and yet fear he wants the Modeſty, as he ſays of others, ſince he continues to peſter the World with ſuch Productions, after ſeeing his wild Notions condemn'd by ſo Auguſt an Aſſembly. Such are the Effects of Faction and Self-Conceit, that they render Men otherwiſe well-qualify'd, inca-

pable of hearkening to Reaſon, or ſubmitting to Authority, as may be ſeen in this Gentleman, who, how capable ſoever in other Reſpects, will never be induc'd to ſubmit his Judgment to the Wiſdom and Information of the Houſe of Lords, and tells us, *Pag.* 19. *That the War in* Spain *has been neglected, is eaſily believ'd by thoſe that know no better, but a very little Examination will clear up this Matter to the meaneſt Underſtanding.* This I confeſs was publiſh'd before the Judgment given by the Lords; but that ought to have convinc'd him, that all his Reaſonings and ſelfiſh Ideas had been Vain and Groundleſs, and have deterr'd him from proceeding to impoſe upon the Publick with any more of his undigeſted Politicks.

Pag. 21. Still holding on his Arguments concerning the ſame ſubject, and forgetting he in another Place tells us ſome Body is better at asking of Queſtions than at anſwering them, he renders himſelf liable to the ſame Reflection, propoſing ſeveral Queries very little to the purpoſe; as to inſtance in the firſt of them, *Why K.* Charles *loſt Six Weeks at* Barcelona, *when he ſhould have been haſtening to* Madrid; which, tho' it ought to have been put to him, and not to the Pamphlet Writers here, I believe may be anſwer'd, by ſaying, He went not, becauſe his Council foreſaw he would be ſoon forc'd to return, as he was ſince, when he did go. And again, for that Part of his laſt Query, to paſs by the reſt as frivolous, which pretends, *The full Pay was given to Captains, who had not Ten Men in their Companies,*

which

which made them return home ſo full of Money, of which there is no inſtance in Flanders: He might have obſerv'd that the great Wealth of thoſe Officers was rather acquir'd by Plunder than by falſe Muſters, as may appear by all our Foreign News: Beſides, that it is impoſſible ſo many Eſtates ſhould be rais'd in ſo ſhort a Time by any Frauds in the Pay; and therefore it appears to have been the ravaging of the Country that enrich'd them all; which Practice was ſo univerſal, the Temptation being ſo great, that I think we never heard of any queſtion'd for it, ſince the famous Expedition at *Port St. Mary*.

Pag. 22. aſſerts, *That the beſt way for* England, *is to draw the War on that ſide, that is in* Spain, *into the leaſt compaſs we can, and keep on the Defenſive:* An excellent Method to conquer ſo great a Nation, when as this ſame Man informs us, there is no Hope of a Revolution; and tells us, That was the Motive of making the firſt Attempt there; and yet now it appears the Affections of the *Spaniards* are entirely ſettled on the King they have receiv'd, we are to force them to caſt him off by making a Defenſive War. All this is nothing to the wonderful Penetration of this Author, in ſhowing upon how unequal a Foot the *French* and we muſt make an Offenſive War in *Catalonia:* To this purpoſe, he ſuppoſes, *We were to ſend from hence an Augmentation of* 20000 *Men, or for our own Share* 10000 *to* Catalonia, *ſhall not we then have* 10000 *leſs in* Flanders, *and may not the* French *leſſen their*

their Army by the ſame number? Now will I ſuppoſe we ſend not the 10000 Men to *Catalonia*, and that the *French* of conſequence do not leſſen their Army by the ſame Number; and then it muſt follow, that our Affairs in *Spain* are abandon'd, and ſtill we are never the ſtronger, proportionably to the *French* in *Flanders*. Oh! but ſays he, *It may be near a Twelvemonth from the Time they lie ready to Embark before they come thither.* No Man that has ever read Two Sheets of Sea Affairs, but would have thought a Twelvemonth rather too much to tranſport Men that were ready to Embark into the *Eaſt-Indies*, and yet no leſs is here allotted for carrying them to *Barcelona*. Perhaps indeed, ſome may have been near ſo long from the Time they were appointed till their Arrival; but then that muſt be imputed to ſome other Cauſes than either want of Wind or Shipping.

However, *Pag.* 25. informs us, *That to* France, *'tis in a manner the ſame Thing in all Reſpects to ſend Men to* Spain *as 'tis to* Flanders; becauſe, *They may fetch them from* Dauphine, *and that Neighbourhood, and their Place may be ſupply'd from the* Rhine, *and theirs again from* Flanders. And pray what hinders the ſame in a manner being done by the Confederates? May not they ſend out of *Italy*, and their Place be ſupply'd out of *Germany*, and theirs again from *Flanders* and *England*. Now what a Myſtery is here made of nothing.

But this is not all; ſays the Manager in the ſame Page; *I would ask theſe Gentlemen, how theſe Troops when they come into* Spain *ſhall ſubſiſt*; *How they ſhall get Horſes, or find Forage, or be provided with ſufficient Magazines*? *They that know any thing of* Spain, *can tell them (but I know they don't want to be told) that the Country is not able to ſubſiſt its own Inhabitants*, &c. The reſt that follows is as wild and groundleſs as what I here quote, as may appear to any Man of common Senſe who has read the common News, and is capable of making a Rational Inference from it. All Mankind has heard that the Confederate Army march'd out of *Catalonia* after the *Spaniſh* to *Zaragoza*, and thence, after the Battle, to *Madrid*, and Twenty or Thirty Leagues beyond it: This they did through an Enemies Country, without any Magazines provided to maintain them, and how long they ſtaid about *Madrid* is well known, tho' the Country being entirely averſe to them refus'd as much as poſſible to bring in Proviſions; yet ſtill this Army ſubſiſted, and had the Natives affected them, they might have done ſo for ſeven Years. This is a plain Demonſtration of the Unreaſonableneſs of the Notion, That *Spain is not able to ſubſiſt its own Inhabitants*. We ſee here an Enemy's Army ſubſiſting ſome Months without any Magazines, and let us look back again we ſhall ſee the *Spaniſh* Army daily encreaſing by the Acceſſion of freſh Troops, and yet living plentifully in the Heart of that very Country, without any Magazines provided before, or poſſibili-

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ty of Relief from abroad. Theſe Facts methinks ſhould convince any Rational Perſon that *Spain* is not that Deſart ſome would repreſent it. If this be not convincing enough, let any one but reflect on the former War between *Spain* and *Portugal*, when two Armies lay for ſeveral Years on thoſe Frontiers, and tell me where they had their Proviſions? Aſcend yet higher and read the Conqueſt of *Spain* by the *Moors*, when an Invaſion of 600000 of thoſe Infidels broke in at once, and were ſoon follow'd by as many more, and let any Man tell me, whence they had their Proviſions, but from that very Country they ſubdu'd! And yet this Politician, this mighty Stateſman runs into that vulgar ignorant Notion, that there are no Proviſions to be had in *Spain*. It is a Shame he ſhould ſhew himſelf ſo ignorant, unleſs it be with him as he ſays of others, that he does not want to be told of it, and only writes to confirm others in their Want of Knowledge. I know this Conceit is fix'd in many Heads beſides his, and indeed the more the Pity, that Men ſhould pretend to be ſo well acquainted with the World, and at the ſame time ſuch utter Strangers to ſo conſiderable and wealthy a Part of *Europe*.

Let us proceed with him to pag. 26. *Now if the Country won't furniſh Neceſſaries, whence are they to be fetch'd? Why either* from England *or* Italy, *except ſome ſmall matter that may be had from the Coaſt of* Africk. After ſo full a Confutation of the former Aſſertion, *That* Spain *is not able to ſubſiſt its own Inha-*

Inhabitants, much leſs an Army of foreign Troops: It is really needleſs to confute other Arguments that ſubſiſt on that Groundleſs Suppoſition, and yet ſince I have this Task in hand, I cannot forbear expoſing Abſurdities of ſo groſs a Nature. Suppoſing then, with the Letter, ſuch a Want of Proviſions in *Spain*, I cannot ſee any ſuch inſuperable Difficulty in ſending Thirty, Forty, or Fifty Sail laden with all Neceſſaries from *Ireland*, which is ſomewhat nearer than *England*, as clear of the Channel, and abounds ſo much in Proviſions that they may be exported at moſt inconſiderable Rates. If this be yet too remote to ſupply all, it may furniſh ſome Part, and *Italy* is near enough to anſwer the reſt. *Some ſmall Matter*, ſays the Letter, *may be had from the Coaſt of* Africk. He would perſwade us *Africk* is as meer a Deſert as he repreſents *Spain*, elſe why *ſome ſmall Matter*, when all *Europe* is ſo fully convinc'd, that thoſe very Coaſts were the Support not of an inconſiderable Army of 20 or 30000 Men, but ſeveral Millions, that is of the greateſt part of *France*, when after the laſt dreadful Winter, had deſtroy'd all the Corn throughout the Nation, the People labour'd under ſuch a Scarcity as muſt have conſum'd Multitudes, had they not receiv'd immenſe ſupplies from thoſe very Coaſts which we are told may afford only *ſome ſmall Matter.*

In Confirmation of the imaginary Impoſibility of ſubſiſting an Army in *Spain*, we are in the ſame Page directed to *ask thoſe who know any thing of our* Flanders *Armies, what would become of them, if Bread and Forage were to be brought them by Sea from Places* 30, 50, *or* 100 *Leagues from them*; with ſome other Queſtions no leſs abſurd and trivial. In anſwer to which I would ask this Queriſt, whether he thinks all the Subſiſtance of thoſe mighty Armies in the *Low-Countries* grows upon the Spot, and whether that Country produces all that furniſhes thoſe immenſe Magazines? If he is ſo unskilful as to judge that Land ſo abundantly fertil as to feed ſo many thouſand Mouths, whole Summers in the Fields and the Winters in Quarters, he might look back but two Years, when, as he ſays of *Spain*, the Product of the Land could not maintain the Natives, and yet both they and the Confederate Army were ſupply'd from *England* and *Ireland*; and the *French* in their Diſtreſs, venturing through Enemy Fleets that lay in their way to intercept them, from *Sweden* and the other Parts of the *Baltick*. Nor is this accidental to one Year, for the Armies generally deſtroy as much as wou'd feed them, and no Soil is able to produce enough for Suſtenance and Waſte, ſo that unleſs their Magazines were fill'd from Places at a greater Diſtance, they muſt inevitably periſh. But it is objected in the ſame Page, that, *the little the Country affords muſt be fetch'd a great Way, and over ſuch Mountains*

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as no Carriages can paſs; all muſt be brought by Mules, which coſt a great deal, and are not to be had for Money, in ſuch Numbers, &c. However, in the very next Page, *It is as well with the* French *as they can wiſh*; for, *when the Wind won't let their Ships come out, they can ſupply their Troops by Land.* This is a moſt unaccountable Contradiction. How muſt the *French* carry their Proviſions over the *Pyrenean* and other Mountains, if the Confederates cannot? Have they any peculiar Art unknown to the others? It is really amazing, that Men of Learning ſhould expoſe themſelves by endeavouring to impoſe ſo groſly upon others. One ſide cannot convey Proviſions over Mountains, or find Mules for Money, and yet the other *has a prodigious Advantage* of ſurmounting all the ſame Difficulties by imaginary Ways and Means.

Then, *How hard it is to Recruit the Troops in this Service, which one may be ſure finds no Volunteers, and thoſe the Law would give it, will of two Evils be glad to chooſe the leaſt, and to prevent being ſent to* Spain, *will liſt themſelves in any other Service. Beſides, when theſe Recruits are rais'd, How ſhall they be ſent? In ſmall Numbers by Packet Boats,* &c. This is much more like Bantering than Reaſoning; for if no Voluntiers can be found for this Service, it is becauſe ſuch Writers have infus'd it into the Heads of the unthinking Multitude, That they are ſent thither to be Starv'd, whilſt thoſe in good Poſts know they go to get Eſtates; whereas, had the private Soldiers been told the

Truth of that Country, they would, if it were in their Power, prefer that before any other Service. Next, the Men the Law would give, will Liſt themſelves in any other Service; that is, they would leap into the Sea to prevent Drowning; for, thoſe who are preſs'd, it is certain never deſign to Liſt at all, and ever hope to avoid being forc'd away; ſo that to Liſt themſelves for *Flanders* for fear of being preſs'd for *Spain*, is to run into the Fire for fear of burning. Laſtly, The Contrivance of ſending Recruits by Packet-Boats is as ridiculous as the reſt; as if the Nation wanted Men of War and Tranſports; beſides, that his Method is to ſend them that Way to *Lisbon*, where they muſt be ſhipp'd again for a Voyage of above 200 Leagues more. This is as valuable an Objection againſt the ſending Troops to *Catalonia*, as if he had laid the Scene in *Flanders*, and told us, The Army there could not be Recruited without Tranſporting our Men in Packet-Boats to *Rotterdam*, and ſhipping them there again for *Oſtend*. From all this Medley, He *cannot but conclude, That nothing can be greater Nonſenſe, or rather greater Villany, than what theſe Writers, or thoſe that direct them, tell us upon this Head.* By what has been here ſaid, I believe it will appear, he may take the Nonſenſe home, and charge it upon his own Letter; and as for the Villany, tho' he is ſo free of it to others, it is too groſs a Word to be retorted, and therefore we will let it drop.

I cannot forbear obſerving in this Place, That either our *Manager* has the Gift of Propheſie, or he contradicts himſelf; for, *Pag.* 29. he ſays, *We have for Four Months and more been impatient to know what is doing in* Spain; *and all Relief from hence, had we known never ſo much, would have come too late to enable our Men to keep the Ground they had with ſo much Glory gain'd:* And then in his Poſtſcript, *Pag.* 39. he pretends, *The News of a Battel loſt in* Spain *is come ſince his Letter was in the Preſs.* Now, how did he know our Men could not keep their Ground before the News of the Battel loſt was brought, without a Revelation; or, if the News was come, as is moſt likely, to what End does he foiſt in that Poſtſcript, unleſs it be to gull the People into an Opinion of all his Aſſertions, by ſeeming to have foreſeen that, by Strength of Reaſon, which prov'd true when the News came. No queſtion but he was one of thoſe who concluded all *Spain* reduc'd by marching to *Madrid*; but now being made ſenſible of his Miſtake too late, he has no other Shift but to run down the War in *Spain*, and repreſent it as impracticable to be ſupported; elſe, why ſhould he make the Query, Why K. *Charles* did not go to *Madrid* before; and then labour to evince, that it is impoſſible to act Offenſively there, or ſubſiſt in the Country? But he certainly concludes, thoſe who read him will never compare one Part of his Letter with another; or, if they do, they either have not Capacity to

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diſcover Incongruities and Contradictions, or will entirely reſign their own Reaſon to the Authority of his Aſſertions.

Hence he proceeds, *Pag.* 31. to give the Reaſons why the War was firſt began in *Catalonia*. I ſhall not enter into that Controverſie, as being ſatisfied the Government had much better Motives than he is able to acquaint us with, beſides, that the Reduction of *Spain* being the main Occaſion of the War, nothing can be more prepoſterous than to put the needleſs Queſtion, or to pretend to argue for the Reaſonableneſs of ſending Forces thither; for notwithſtanding his Notion of *Revulſion, and his childiſh Fancy of throwing down* B. *which is at the top of* A. *by pulling down* A. *Pag.* 36. Revulſion alone is no Cure without proper Remedies applied to the Part affected, and the beſt way to pull down a Houſe is not by digging away the Foundations; nor can the propereſt Means to reduce a mighty Kingdom, be, to keep at the greateſt diſtance from it. Thus we ſee how eaſily ſome People make a Tranſition from one Impertinency to another, either as their own natural Bent leads them, or as they imagine they may lead others.

And to ſee how incoherent this Gentleman is with himſelf, he goes on, at *Pag.* 32. thus; *Beſides, you may remember, that at the time this War in* Catalonia *was begun, we had not the leaſt Proſpect of making ſuch mighty Conqueſts in* Flanders, *which was every Inch of it in the* French *Hands; and 'twas more than any Body could tell, when it would be*

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otherwiſe, much leſs could they hope to ſee any Poſſibility of penetrating into France *on that ſide.* This one would think enough to repreſent the carrying on the War in *Flanders* as little feaſible as in *Catalonia*; for what could be ſaid more than that *there was not the leaſt Proſpect of making Conqueſts there; and they could not hope to ſee any Poſſibility of penetrating on that ſide*; and yet this ſame Author takes up almoſt half his Second Letter upon arguing for the War in *Flanders*, tho' he has before repreſented it as void of Proſpect and Succeſs, or even the Hope of Poſſibility of advancing. What an excellent Connexion of Argument is this? Every Thing is practicable or impracticable by Fits, as it makes for or againſt him. *Spain* muſt be invaded, or abandon'd, as he conceits; and *Flanders* is, or is not, a proper Place to puſh the War in, as the Humour takes him.

Pag. 33. *The beſt Judges were ſure of the Succeſs:* Experience has ſhown whether they were the beſt; and ſure it is, that many who were look'd upon as very incompetent and inconſiderable, were of quite another Opinion: The *Spaniards* being well known to be a more tenacious People of what they embrace, I mean the *Caſtilians*, and all Parts ſubject to that Crown; for whoſoever has read any Thing of Hiſtory, cannot but know the *Catalonians* are quite of another Temper, having been frequently in Arms againſt their Kings, whoſe Title was never queſtion'd. Nor could there be any ſufficient ground for ſuch Security

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in the Reports of the Admiral of *Caſtile*, or a few other Fugitives, it being always natural for ſuch Perſons to magnify their Intereſt, and repreſent all things eaſie, in order to draw others in to eſpouſe their Party, and ſupport them in that Grandeur they aim at for themſelves, rather than the Promotion of any other. In the ſame Page we are told; *We gain'd Footing enough to encourage a Revolt in the other Kingdoms, but not to force one.* I take this to be altogether a new Thought and Expreſſion, for if a People be averſe from revolting when they have Encouragement, Force may bring them to Submiſſion, but I cannot think it can ever make them revolt; ill Uſage from their own Prince often prevails with Subjects to rebel, but the Hardſhips and Oppreſſion they ſuffer from Invaders rather ſecures their Affections to the Sovereign, who endeavours to protect them, tho' he prove unfortunate in his Undertakings. But pag. 34 and 35 *This little Piece of* Spain *had Four Years ago let us into a full Poſſeſſion of the whole, had not a fatal and unaccountable Miſmanagement ruin'd all.* Here we had all to nothing, but for one Miſmanagement, and yet juſt before it was *Nonſenſe* and *Villany* to talk of puſhing the War there. If we were once ſo very near, one would think it were not wholly impoſſible to be ſo again, provided the ſame Means be uſed that put us then into that mighty Probability of ſucceeding; and yet muſt we believe this Gentleman when he tells us, it is a Madneſs to attempt it, and that the only way to ſubdue

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Spain is never to come near it, for fear of being put to Trouble and Charges; there being a much ſhorter way in his Opinion, which is by conquering *France*, and ſo marching dry Foot over the *Pyrenean* Mountains, which perhaps he takes to be the Work of a few Weeks, and as eaſily to be put in Execution as writ down on Paper. This is much like dreyning a River, when the Enemy is on the other Side of it, to come at him, rather than be at the Expence and Uneaſineſs of marching a League farther and laying a Bridge over; or ſending Goods 300 Miles by Land, out of good Husbandry, to ſave Water-Carriage.

We come now to to the Concluſion of this firſt Letter, which indeed is like the reſt, Pompous and Magiſterial, in theſe Words. *Read now again theſe admired Pamphlets, and when their general Declamations have amus'd you, and you begin to think there is ſomething in them, then turn to this true State of the Caſe, and the Miſt they have caſt before you will vaniſh.* What a Numskul Tory does this Manager ſuppoſe his Correſpondent to be, or would he repreſent him to the World, did not every Man know his Title was a general Direction to all who are diſtinguiſh'd under the Denomination of *Tories*, in order to render them the more contemptible. He ſuppoſes a Miſt before all their Eyes upon the reading thoſe Pamphlets he diſlikes, and nothing to diſpel it but the bright Beams of his ſelf admired Letter. He conceits ſuch Force in his reaſoning, that all muſt immediately ſubſcribe to it.

Another would modeſtly have ſubmitted his Arguments to the Judgment of a Friend, and eſpecially one dignify'd with the Name of a Member; but this infallible Writer is above that Compliment, his Judgment is definitive, there lies no Appeal from it. Nay, we are not only to be out of Conceit with thoſe Pamphlets, but to join with him in *an utter Deteſtation and Abhorrence of the black Villany and Malice ſome Men have us'd to ruin the Reputation of the ableſt and moſt faithful Miniſters*, &c. Who thoſe Men, or what Miniſters thoſe are we know not, nor does he think fit to tell us, ſo that we are to abhor and deteſt whatſoever he ſhall enjoyn, and on what account he pleaſes, or elſe be expos'd to his Indignation, and conſequently to be charg'd with as much Villany and Malice as he ſhall vouchſafe to lay at our Doors. He now ſuppoſes himſelf and his Correſpondent ſufficiently tired, and indeed I am ſo as well as they with his firſt Rhapſody, and yet in Obedience to your Lordſhips Commands, muſt proceed to the Second.

I have paſs'd by very many Particulars in the firſt Letter, which might deſerve to be taken notice of, as well as thoſe I have hinted at, but to ſpeak to all would be too tedious, and my other Duties require my Attendance, ſo that I ſhall be ſtill ſhorter in Relation to the ſecond Letter, as well to ſpare time, as becauſe indeed it is rather a Panegyrick on the D. of *M*———. or a Rhetorical Narrative of his Actions, than what the Author would have us take it for. And

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as I have all due Deference for that Great Perſon, it ſhall be ever far from my Thoughts to detract from what any other ſhall write in his Praiſe, and yet I cannot but think a ſordid Flattery as unbecoming my Function as vile Detraction. The one ruins a Man's Reputation, in the Eye of the World, and the other utterly undoes him with himſelf, as clouding his Reaſon with the dark Miſts of Pride, Vanity and Self-Conceit, which wherever they take Poſſeſſion abſolutely diveſt the unfortunate Perſon of all thoſe excellent Qualities by which he might be perhaps at firſt deſerving of the publick Eſteem, for as *Juvenal* ſays

Nihil eſt quod credere de ſe
Non poſſit, cum laudatur Dijs æqua poteſtas.

Daily Experience ſhews us the Truth of this Aſſertion, when even the meaneſt and moſt undeſerving are puff'd up and commit a thouſand Follies, they would never have been guilty of, were not their Imaginations diſtracted by the Commendations they receive from others like themſelves. The moſt deſerving are ſubject to the ſame Humane Frailties, and Ambition is naturally inherent to great Minds, which often carries them beyond themſelves ſo far as almoſt to forget they are Men, eſpecially when heightn'd with Applauſe, and hearing their Merits extoll'd above Meaſure. Thoſe who have undertaken the Charge of promoting Chriſtian Virtue ought to give a Check to theſe aſpiring Thoughts, which corrupt

Nature is ſo apt to ſuggeſt, putting them in mind of the many Frailties the beſt of Mortals are ſubject to, that they may have a Time for Reflection, to prevent the Danger of being rais'd ſo high as to have the more dangerous Fall. Our *Manager*, on the contrary, only ſtudies to play the Orator, without regarding the Part of a Preacher; he is all for magnifying his Hero without ever giving him the Mortification to think he is Man; and as this moſt certainly is not the Part of a Miniſter of the Goſpel, we may without judging raſhly, conclude, it is not ſo much the Honour of the Perſon commended he contends for, as his own Advancement. Some Men find mighty Charms in a Miter, which is a Sort of Spiritual Crown, and has the Honour of Peerage to flatter their Ambition, and the Addition of a conſiderable Revenue to ſatisfie their Avarice. They regard not the Cares which ought to attend that Dignity, becauſe they have no true Notion of it; nay, were it not for the Profits, they would deteſt the very Name of Epiſcopacy; but Wealth makes it agreeable, and that is the End they aim it.

I have already acquainted your Lordſhip, how improper I judge it for Men of my Coat to ſet up for Stateſmen, and how unreaſonable for all Men in low Stations, to judge of the Government; which at once takes me off the Neceſſity of ſaying any Thing to the Two Points of puſhing the War in *Flanders*, or elſewhere, and the prolonging of it in general. I cannot pre-

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tend to be Soldier enough to decide which is the propereſt Place to make War; nor had I ever the Honour of being admitted into the Council, to know who was for Protracting, or who for putting an End to it; and at the ſame time, I verily believe, this Manager, as ſupercilious as he appears, is able to give no better Account of either than my ſelf; this I am ſure of, that it is no more his Buſineſs than mine. I ſhall therefore, as hitherto, forbear touching upon thoſe Parts which are ſo much above me, and only Remark upon the Author.

Pag. 2. Undertaking to ſhew the War could be no where puſh'd but in *Flanders*, he ſays, He has *already ſhown it was impractivable in* Spain; and I think I have made it out before that he ſhow'd nothing but Conceit, without any Thing of Reality. Then for doing it by Way of the *Rhine*, his Argument againſt it is like many others of his; for he tells us, *The War was carried from the* Danube *to the* Rhine, *and thence to the* Moſelle; *and the next Year a great Army was carried thither, that being confeſſedly the weakeſt ſide; but through Diſappointments, this was not at all to the Advantage of the common Cauſe.* I would deſire any Man to inform me, whether this be any Thing to the Purpoſe. He undertakes to prove the War cannot be puſh'd on the *Rhine*; and to make it out, informs us of an Attempt made on the *Moſelle* and diſappointed. Was it then of Neceſſity to try at the *Moſelle*, and was there no other way of coming at the *Rhine*? And again, Sup-

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poſing that the only Way, Muſt it of Neceſſity follow the Thing was Impracticable becauſe diſappointed? It is rather quite contrary; for that we are told, *is confeſſedly the weakeſt ſide:* Then if it be confeſſedly ſo, it is unaccountable he ſhould argue from thence, That it is more impracticable than the ſtrongeſt; where, as he ſaid in his firſt Letter, there *was no Hope of Poſſibility of penetrating.* That the Generals had good Reaſons for what they did, I am far from queſtioning; but that a Man of Parts ſhould pretend to aſſign that for a Reaſon which is none at all, muſt be very ſurpriſing to all that read him.

Theſe ſtrange Flights are follow'd by others as lofty, concerning the Act of Security, which I think do not deſerve any Notice to be taken of them, both as being foreign from the *Management of the War*, and of no more Moment in themſelves than the others before them; and then he falls again to his Method of Query, *Why the Confederates ſo readily gave into the carrying on the War in* Flanders; which is ſo obvious, that I believe every Politick Cobler would anſwer him. The *Dutch* muſt needs be for it, ſince it ſecur'd their own Frontiers, and they had a Poſſibility, as has ſince hapned of getting all the *Low Countries* into their own Hands; and the Emperor neither could oppoſe the Reſolutions of his two greateſt Allies; or if it had been in his Power were it proper, when he expected his Family ſhould be put in Poſſeſſion of all that was gain'd there. Theſe Things are ſo plain,

that

that there was little Occaſion for ſo many Queſtions to be put about them; yet ſo conceited is this Gentleman of his mighty Talent, that he cannot keep himſelf within the Bounds of Moderation, or even good Manners, all who do not write to his Tooth are dignify'd with vile Titles, the *French* are all Scriblers, and the *Engliſh* Pamphleteers, blind Guides, and mercenary Tools of a Party. He would do well to tell us, Whether thoſe he calls a Faction, and a Party, may not make the ſame Judgment of him; for as the Robber told *Alexander the Great*, That he was much a greater Robber than himſelf, ſince he took whole Provinces and Kingdoms; ſo may we ſay, he is more mercenary who writes for a conſiderable Preferment, than the other who does it only for a few Guineas; and the latter may be as honeſt, as intelligent, and as able as the former.

The reſt of this Second Letter, and the greater Part of it, under the ſpecious Pretence of ſhewing, That the War has not been prolong'd, is a Narrative of the D. of *M.*'s Actions during the Courſe of it, and a Panegyrick on his mighty Atchievements, and wiſe Councils; all which, ſince it is not my Part to write Satyr, I think more proper to paſs by, tho' much might be ſaid in relation to the Orator; and yet in reſpect to the great Perſon he extols, it ſhall not be taken Notice of, leſt according to his Politicks, he endeavour to perſuade the World, that the expoſing of his Frailties is deſign'd as a leſſening of the General.

His

His Concluſion, *Pag.* 41. is really extra-ordinary: There he exerts his Talent in the courteous Language of *infamous Libellers*, thrown among all thoſe that have incurr'd his Indignation: And a little lower, *infamous Methods* us'd to ſupport the Cauſe he diſapproves of; and then the ſtrongeſt of all his Arguments, which is crying out of *France* and the *Pretender*, Words as prevalent with the unthinking Creatures he writes for, as *Popery* and *Slavery*, which upon moſt Occaſions, without farther ſhew of Reaſon, ſerve to heighten them to fly in the Face of Authority.

I fear I have already tir'd your Lordſhip's Patience, which obliges me to break off the more abruptly, leaving the other Two Letters, concerning *the Negociations for a Treaty of Peace in* 1709. for another Opportunity, that I may have Time to ſtudy Brevity; becauſe in theſe Caſes, where almoſt every Line affords ſufficient Matter for Reproof, the only difficulty is to ſtop the Pen from running too far, which might nauſeate your Lordſhip, who is ſo competent a Judge in theſe Affairs, to whoſe leaſure, I entirely ſubmit my ſelf, and am, with all poſſible reſpect,

Your Lordſhip's,

Moſt obedient Servant.

FINIS.

My Lord,

I Muſt confeſs, it is not without much Reluctancy, that I put Pen to Paper again upon this Account; my natural Inclination to Unity diſſuades me from having a Hand in any Thing that looks like Party, and the Duties of my Function call me away from Temporal Affairs; but ſtill the Deference I owe to your Lordſhip's Commands prevails, becauſe *Obedience is better than Sacrifice*; and I truſt in your Goodneſs, that theſe my private Thoughts will not be expos'd to publick View. My laſt grew upon me in ſpight of all my Endeavours, to bring it into a ſhorter Compaſs, tho' ſo little is ſaid in it to the Second Letter concerning *the Management of the War*, and theſe Two on *the Negociations for a Treaty of Peace in* 1709. I much fear will oblige me to be no leſs tedious, notwithſtanding all my Care to cut ſhort, and paſs over many Things, to which much might be ſaid. This I ſhall alſo do, to avoid, as I have hitherto done, intermedling in the leaſt, where Miniſters of State, or other worthy Perſons employ'd in the Government, are concern'd; all I have to ſay is only to the Author of the Letters, who ſeems ſo fond of himſelf, and yet furniſhes us with nothing that may cultivate that great Opinion he would perſuade the World to have of

him. I am not inſenſible, that he, and all thoſe of his Kidney, are good at *Innuendo*, and will oblige a Man to mean whatſoever they pleaſe, tho' he be never ſo cautious in placing his Words; for whatſoever Croſſes them is interpreted to be maliciouſly deſign'd againſt the Government. If a Man Bows going into a Church, he is Superſtitious; if he oppoſes Atheiſm, he is Popiſhly affected; if he Names the King of *France* without railing, he is in the *French* Intereſt; if he thinks Paſſive Obedience a Virtue, he is for ſlaviſh Principles; if he queſtions the uncontroulable Prerogative of the People, and talks of a Divine Right in Kings, he is for the Pretender; if he ſpeaks civilly of the new Miniſtry, that is railing at the old; if he but wiſhes for a Peace, one of the greateſt Bleſſings upon Earth, that is, betraying his Country and the Liberties of *Europe*; if he does but lament his own Misfortunes under a general Decay of Trade, and other concomitants of a tedious War, that is, being a Grumbletonian, and one that is never ſatisfy'd under the bleſſed Circumſtances of Starving; if in Chriſtian Compaſſion, he feells ſome regret at the Effuſion of ſo much Chriſtian Blood, that is, Puſilanimity, Hypocriſie and Diſaffection to the Cauſe; and if for quietneſs Sake he endeavours to carry himſelf even between both Extremes, then is he dubb'd a Trimmer, a Luke-warm Wretch, and fit to be ſpew'd out of Company. Thus, let a Man talk, look, tread, or even think a-wry, that is, never ſo little diſagreeably

to

to thoſe fiery Perſons; nay, if he does not run full tilt with them, rail where they rail, and magnifie where they magnifie, he muſt expect no better Quarter than to be ſtigmatiz'd with the Titles of a Libeller, a proſtitute Creature, a mercenary Wretch, an inſolent Fellow, a Villain, and much more ſuch ſignificant Language, ſome of which we have already had in the two firſt Letters of *the Management of the War*, and ſhall meet with more in the other Two of *the Negociations of Peace*, particularly in the Poſtſcript to the firſt of theſe, concerning which I may chance to add a Word in that Place; for which Reaſon they ought to have been inſcrib'd as a late Pamphlet was, *In uſum Billingſgate, for the Information* of Porters, Carmen, Watermen, Oyſter-Women, Orange-Women, *&c.* My Averſion to the Task your Lordſhip has laid on me inſenſibly draws me away, yet I muſt comply; and to begin.

Pag. 1. of the firſt Letter, the Author there undertakes, to give *a fair and plain Account of what has been doing theſe Two Years, with reſpect to Peace*; and a little lower, tells us, *There is no Point the People are ſo uneaſie at, or ſo much in the dark about, and conſequently in which they can be ſo eaſily impos'd on by falſe Inſinuations.* This *fair and plain Account* cannot but be ſuſpected coming from ſuch a Hand, and it would have been very proper to have inform'd the World from whence he had it; for, if the generality of People are ſo much

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in the dark, they will want to know how he came to be ſo enlightned. We have never heard that he was employ'd as Plenipotentiary, to be ſo thoroughly acquainted with all the Steps taken in that Affair; and if he has hapned to ſay Grace to ſome of thoſe Miniſters, it will hardly be believ'd they ſhould lay themſelves ſo open to him over their Meat; thoſe Stateſmen are generally more reſerv'd, and ſute their Table-Talk to their Company; and the Darkneſs the People are in as to that Point, is a ſufficient Teſtimony of the Secrecy of thoſe entruſted. But perhaps, Politicians may have impos'd on him, as Generals often do on Spies, letting drop Words, importing ſome Deſign they have not, to the end the conveying of that to the Enemy may the better conceal what they really intend. This perhaps may have given him ſome Glimmering, like an *Ignis Fatuus*, which he follows as a true Light, venturing at Precipices, and dragging through Hedges and Quagmires to attain his expected End. The eaſier he tells us it is to impoſe on the People, by reaſon of their Ignorance, the more cautious ought they to be in giving Credit to his pretended *fair and plain Account*; which, ſubſiſting upon his naked Authority, can have no more Weight than his other Aſſertions, the Validity of ſome of which has been ſufficiently expos'd in my laſt; and I queſtion not, but this will further evince, how little Cauſe there is to rely in his bare Affirmative.

Pag. 2. labours hard to perſuade, That the *Inſinuations* above-mention'd *come from thoſe whoſe Intereſt it is to lay all the Load they can upon the late M. and the D. of* M. which is prepoſſeſſing his Readers, That whoſoever is inclinable to Peace, or deſirous to be inform'd why it was not accepted of when offer'd upon ſuch Terms, as they thought in their private Judgments might be Advantageous, are Slanderers and Revilers of thoſe Noble Perſons he points at; to the End, that their Imaginations, being thus fir'd with Indignation, againſt thoſe who preſume to defame Perſons ſo lately in the higheſt Poſts, they may be the leſs capable of diſtinguiſhing between Truth and Deluſion. This is winding up the Paſſions, that they may run down with the greater Force to overpour Reaſon, and this Art is carried on.

Pag. 3. where the *French* and their King are repreſented like the vileſt of Mortals. I am ſenſible, that is pleaſing and agreeable to all thoſe whom natural Prejudice has made averſe to that Nation, yet it cannot be allow'd to be a generous or Chriſtian Practice. To ſubdue Enemies is manly, but to revile them is mean and unbecoming great Minds. National Reflections are the moſt unpardonable, as involving Multitudes in a Defamation, no Man that is guilty of it can himſelf believe to be true. There is a reſpect due to crown'd Heads, which ſome People are utter Strangers to, whoſe only ſtudy is how to leſſen their own Sovereigns and bring them into Contempt,

and conſequently they can never afford any King a better Title, than Uſurper, Tyrant, Faith-Breaker, or ſome other no leſs infamous. I know I muſt expect the Character above hinted at, given by thoſe who think railing at Potentates a Virtue; but that muſt not deter me from my Duty, good Manners can never be a Crime, tho' never ſo maliciouſly interpreted; and ſince we are commanded to love our Enemies, we may well afford them common Civility. It is a very raſh Judgment that is grounded on Intentions; and yet we are told, the *French are ſo far from keeping of Treaties, that they intend to break them at the very time they are making them.* This is a general Charge, the particular Inſtance is the Treaty of *Reſwick*, where they are again in general Terms, ſaid, *Not to have executed a great Part of it, and to have executed other Parts of it in ſo Scandalous a Manner, as defeated in a great Meaſure the Intention of it.* Here it would have been proper to inſert the Articles ſo broken and eluded, which we are left to find out, or elſe to take upon Truſt. As for the verbal Part here mention'd, no Man I think will ever believe, That either King *William*, or the *Dutch*, after ſo many Conferences, and ſuch tedious Debates as were about that Peace, would conclude upon any Thing that was not in Writing, ſign'd and ratify'd; ſo that we have much reaſon to queſtion the Truth of the Author's Dialogue, between Mareſchal *Bouflers* and the Earl of *Portland*. He has taken Care, *Pag.* 4. to verifie what I have ſaid above, by adding, That *Fault*

will be eaſily forgiven the French *King by ſome Men, for the Sake of a Correſpondence which could not be ſo eaſily carried on, if the St.* Germain's *Court were remov'd farther off*; that is, in other Words, Whoſoever does not revile the *French* holds Correſpondence at St. *Germains*. Your Lordſhip perceives, how dangerous it is not to rail for Company, no leſs than being declar'd an Enemy to the Government, and holding Correſpondence with its Enemies. Such is the Moderation of ſome Men, who make moſt uſe of that Word. I do not undertake to Apologize for the *French*, and muſt own my ſelf wholly unacquainted with their Intentions, and no competent Judge of their Sincerity, both which the Letter-Writer ſo thoroughly underſtands; my Deſign is only to defend Reaſon and Charity.

Preliminaries it is likely, as is aſſerted, *Pag. 7.* may be requiſite before *entring into any Conferences for a general Peace.* Theſe Preliminaries, according to the natural Senſe of the Word, all Men underſtand to be ſome previous Diſpoſitions towards a Treaty, or Heads to Treat and Debate upon. Now, without entering into the Controverſie for blaming or juſtifying the Proceedings of thoſe entruſted, who, no doubt, acted according to their Inſtructions, and therefore could be liable to no Cenſure, to require of an Enemy all that can poſſibly be demanded of him in the greateſt Rigour by way of Preliminary, I cannot but think is without any Preſident, and ſeems to carry a Contradiction in it ſelf;

for if all be not granted, no Treaty will be allow'd of; and if it be comply'd with, there remains nothing to be tranſacted in a Treaty. Who can expect that a Monarch ſhall diveſt himſelf of a vaſt Dominion, deliver up all his ſtrong Holds, and leave himſelf Naked and Defenceleſs by way of Preliminary, to expect ſuch other Conditions of Peace as his Enemies ſhall afterwards preſcribe? But we are told, the *French* are deceitful, and never intend to perform what they Promiſe; if they are ſo, of conſequence they muſt be the more Jealous of thoſe who lay this Infidelity to their Charge. *The Allies on the other ſide are all Honour, and were never known to violate their Words:* Whether the *French* be of that Opinion or no is ſtill a queſtion, and either way, it can never be ſuppos'd, that a Prince, who is ſtill able to bring an Army into the Field, will rather chooſe to relie on the Courteſie of his Enemies, than once more try the Chance of War, which is well known to be ſo uncertain, that often, by an unexpected Accident, the greateſt Powers have been brought down to nothing, and the moſt Deſpicable have been rais'd up to the higheſt Pitch of Fortune. *Hannibal*, after repeated Victories, made his Way to the Gates of *Rome*, and yet the *Romans*, rouſing out of their Conſternation, not only ſav'd their City and *Italy*, but drew him back into *Africk*, overthrew his conquering Army, and ſubdu'd his Miſtreſs Commonwealth, the City of *Carthage*. The *Gauls* had before gone further, and

taken

taken the City, ſo that nothing remain'd to compleat its Ruin but the taking of the Capitol; yet, by a ſurpriſing Change, *Camillus* routed them, and reſcu'd his Country. It is needleſs to go into Foreign Countries for Inſtances of this kind, where we might find infinite Numbers, our own furniſhes us with many, and among them thoſe of our Two warlike Kings *Edward* III. and *Henry* V. are remarkable, againſt the ſame Enemy *France*, which they ſo far over-run, as to Entail the Title upon their Poſterity; and yet, How little beſides that bare Title ſoon after remain'd in their Poſſeſſion?

Another grievous Charge laid to the *French* in the ſame Page, is, That before the Conferences at the *Hague*, they had prieviouſly been feeling the Pulſe of the *Dutch*. This to me ſeems to be a Crime might be eaſily forgiven them, without any great Reproach. Nature ever dictates all that may tend to Self-Preſervation; and if they, being hard ſet on all Sides, labour'd to throw off Part of the Weight that help'd to bear them down, I cannot think it is any more than what the moſt generous of the Allies would have done under the like Circumſtances. And I well remember at that time, the *Dutch* were foully ſuſpected to be very far ingag'd; and it was thought ſome powerful Charms, ſuch as lead thoſe People any Way, prevail'd to draw them off again.

Pag. 9. We have a curious politick Flouriſh upon the Wiſdom of Her Ma——y's Choice, in theſe Words, *'Tis but an odd way for a Party to expreſs their great Deference to the Judgment of a Sovereign they tell you they adore, to ridicule the Choice ſhe has made of a Plenipotentiary. Infallibility, I confeſs, is no Part of the Prerogative, tho' it ſeems to be growing faſhionable of late with theſe Men, to think, or rather ſay ſo; which makes it the more extraordinary for them to cenſure Her M——y ſo freely as they do*, &c. This is ſheer Wit, a two edg'd Sword, and will ſerve to cut every way. The one is a Ridicule upon the divine Right of Sovereigns, upon Paſſive Obedience, upon the Reſpect due to Crown'd Heads, as appears by *implicite Admirers of Her M——y's Royal Wiſdom; a Sovereign they tell you they adore; Infallibity.* The other is a Charge upon thoſe very Men, as if they preſumptuouſly condemn'd her M——'s Conduct, which we have in theſe Words, *for them to cenſure Her Majeſty ſo freely as they do.* How ingeniouſly are the Non-Reſiſtance Men here at once derided and upraided. *Infallibility, he confeſſes is no part of the Prerogative, tho' it ſeems to be growing faſhionable with thoſe Men to think, or rather to ſay ſo*; Here he drives the Sarcaſm Home, as if thoſe Men he ſpeaks of would carry the Kingly Prerogative ſo high as to make it infallible; when on the other Side it is well known there is a Race of Men that would allow the Crown no Prerogative at all, they are either for a Titular Precarious Prince, or rather for none at all, as has been

been long and is ſtill verify'd by all their Words and Actions. It is their peculiar Prerogative to revile Majeſty, but if any one of thoſe who are not for dethroning it, do but ſuggeſt the leaſt Diſlike of any Perſon in Authority, they will be the firſt that ſhall expoſe them as diſſaffected and diſreſpectful. One conſiderable Part of this Gentleman's four Letters on War and Peace has been exclaiming againſt the little Change that has been made in the Miniſty, he thinks every thing muſt needs go wrong on that Account; the D. of *M*——— he complains has been ill us'd, in ſo much that, he owns in his Fourth Letter p. 64. *He is afraid he is not likly to do ſo much at this time, when he is uneaſy in his Thoughts, undermin'd in the Favour of his Sovereign*, &c. Let him now look back to what he has ſaid of the others cenſuring Her M——y, and conſider how far he has out done them in that Point, and how little of that Modeſty he practices, which he ſaid is wanting in them.

We now enter upon a long Detail of the whole Treaty at the *Hague*, which is deliver'd to us, not only as if the Writer had been a Plenipotentiary, and taken Notes at every Conference, but with his uſual Penetration, like one that ſaw into the very Hearts and moſt ſecret Deſigns of the *French* diſcovering every Thought and every cunning Deſign of theirs; the chiefeſt whereof he tells us, p. 12. was *To enſnare the Maritime Powers, if they could, and draw them into a baſe Deſign of ſacrificing the Intereſt of their Allies to their own.* It is not improba-

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ble the *French* might have ſuch a View, and I believe no Man of Senſe can blame them for it, ſince it ſo much concern'd them to break the Confederacy, if poſſible, and endeavour to ſatisfy one or two, rather than part with ſo much to ſatisfy all. Nor had they Cauſe wholly to deſpair of Succeſs, who could remember that but a very few Years before, thoſe Maritime Powers had actually concluded a Peace with them, notwithſtanding the Oppoſition made on the Part of the Emperor, who had a Time aſſign'd him to come into it, or in caſe of Refuſal to ſtand by himſelf.

Pag. 13. *No body had ever doubted, but that there was ſuch an Underſtanding between the* French *King and his Grandſon, that the Former could oblige the Latter to reſign the Spaniſh Monarchy whenever he pleaſed.* Here is an abſolute Authoricative Aſſertion upon the Opinions of Mankind without asking the Conſent of the major Part, for it may very well be ſuppos'd he concluded of all by his own Notion of the thing, or at beſt by the Belief of ſome that thought like him. It's well known the Difference is very great between giving and taking away; every Man is ready to receive whatſoever is for his Conveniency and Advantage; but it is rare to find any inclinable to part with it, even to the Donor. A Father often ſettles on his Son, without any Inſtance of Refuſal in ſuch Caſes, and yet I believe it will be no leſs difficult to produce an Example of any that has conſented to a Reſumption, or freely reſign'd ſuch Settlement. And ſuch Reſumption

ſumption is much more unlikely in Caſe of a Crown, which is ſupported by Power, and the Poſſeſſor will ſcarce be perſwaded to quit without Compulſion. The *French* we are told p. 14. anſwer'd to this effect, and thereupon the Author runs his Deſcant at Pleaſure, little worth regarding, and p. 16. puts the Caſe, *which is more reaſonable, for* France *to truſt the Allies, or the Allies* France? which he ſays, *cannot be a very hard Queſtion*; and indeed it is eaſie enough, for without all doubt, whatſoever real Reaſons there may be to the contrary, Partiality will ſo far prevail on all Men, as to think it more reaſonable to be truſted, than to truſt; and no doubt but the moſt faithleſs Perſon, will for the ſame Reaſon rather urge another ought to confide in him, than he to put his whole Fortune into the Hands of a moſt ſincere and honeſt Dealer; and this much more among Sovereigns, who have no Courts to ſue in for their Right, but muſt depend upon the Deciſion of the Sword, which therefore they will never be prevail'd with to lay down, and commit their Titles to the Diſpoſal of the moſt generous Enemy. Now to whom do's he put this Queſtion, for a Queſtion ask'd muſt be anſwer'd by ſomebody, or it ſtands for nothing; if he puts it to the *French*, it is plain they will anſwer partially for themſelves, and that he will not allow of; if to the Allies, he has anſwer'd for them and the *French* will not ſtand to it. Thus either way the Queſtion is impertinent, as is

much more of the Argument, to paſs by all which,

Pag. 17. is very remarkable for this unaccountable Sentence, *Beſides it muſt be own'd there is a great Probity, Plainneſs and Honeſty both in the* Dutch *and* Germans *which appear in all the Affairs of Common Life.* What a wonderful Diſcovery have we here of a thing that has been ſo long unknown to the World. *The Probity, Plainneſs and Honeſty of the* Dutch. This is certainly his own Thought, he could never borrow it, for in my little Reading, I cannot call to Mind that ever I met with it before, he ſhould have added their *Religion* to compleat the Character; and have ſent us to *Japan* to enquire about it, if we could find no ſatisfactory Information nearer. *Pumica fides* grew into a Proverb among the *Romans* and has been in the latter Ages frequently apply'd to that honeſt Nation, ſo much reſembling the *Carthaginians*, that another great Man ſpeaking of them ſaid, *delenda eſt Carthago.* There is ſcarce any corner of the World that has not furniſh'd us with Inſtances of their *Probity, Plainneſs and Honeſty*, witneſs *Amboyna, Polloroon, Sumatra, Bantam* and many other Places in the *Eaſt-Indies*; *Guiana, Surinan*, and others in the *Weſt*; their Behaviour towards their Patroneſs Queen *Elizabeth*, the Fiſhery in our own Seas, and infinite other Inſtances, which I have not Leiſure nor Inclination to repeat, nor ſhould I take the leaſt notice of them were they not publickly known to all Mankind.

Pag.

Pag. 19. furniſhes us with another Argument againſt the *French* as pertinent as his former; and is, That they meant nothing leſs than the Reſtitution of *Spain*, becauſe the War was carried on vigorouſly by the Duke of *Anjou* in *Spain*. One would think this Gentleman had never heard, that Princes generally make Peace with Sword in Hand, and improve all the Advantages they can gain during a Treaty to make the Conditions the eaſier. Beſides, the *Spaniards*, carrying on the War ſo vigorouſly, ſhow'd, That whatſoever the King of *France* tranſacted in *Holland*, they would not ſubmit to it, if in Prejudice of their King; and this was a farther Demonſtration, that the recalling of that Prince was not ſo eaſie as the Letter would repreſent it. Much to the ſame Purpoſe is the mention of the Prince of *Aſturias*, being acknowledg'd Preſumptive Heir of *Spain*, *Pag.* 20. which was a Confirmation of the Affection of the *Spaniards* to their King, and no Act of the *French*, as their Miniſters anſwer'd. Another heinous Crime is charg'd upon the *French* King, *Pag.* 23. and is, His endeavouring to gain the Affections of his own Subjects, by propoſing a Treaty of Peace; in other Places he is ſuch a Tyrant, that he carries all by Dint of Violence and Oppreſſion; and yet here he is no leſs than Unjuſt and Perfidious, for uſing Means to gain his People's Affections, becauſe ſo ſucceſsful as to compaſs it.

How

How ſhall we do to underſtand this Gentleman, or reconcile him to himſelf? He has told us all along, That the *French* were inſincere, and never could be brought to any Thing the Allies could accept of in order to a good Peace, and therefore their Propoſals were rejected; and yet now, when he comes to the breaking up of the Conferences, after the *French* Miniſters had offer'd all they thought reaſonable, or were empower'd to propoſe, he tells us firſt, *Pag.* 24. That when they had declar'd their Departure in the Morning, the Allies expected they ſhould alter before Night; but when that was come, and no Change in them, *Pag.* 25. *The D. of* M—— *ſent to the Penſioner, and the other Miniſters, to deſire a Meeting, to try once more if any Thing could be done to ſave the Treaty*; nay, this failing, *He would not give over all Hopes of having one Interview more, to which end he got to* Bruſſels, *as ſoon almoſt as Monſieur* Rouille *who was gone before.* What Connection is there between theſe two Accounts? The one informs us, the *French* would not come to any Terms that could be admitted by the Allies; and the other, that as ſoon as they were gone, there was nothing but poſting after them. They had offer'd all that was in their Power, and were rejected, as bidding too little, and yet ſo much Anxiety to fetch them again when it was too late. It is certain, they would not have gone without propoſing the utmoſt, and to ſend after them to ask more muſt be to no Purpoſe. On the other hand,

hand, if the Allies were for coming to their Terms, they could not be ſo unreaſonable, as our *Negociator* imagines. Thus we plainly ſee, he knows nothing of what he writes as Fact, but only delivers his Notions of Things as he fancies they were or might have been; which, if it does but ſerve to amuze and gull the unwary, is enough to ſerve his turn; and if any ſhould happen to penetrate into the Art of Invention, he may ſtill Hope to gain the Reputation of a Political Romancer. However, to put the better Colour upon the Fiction, he aſſures us, *Pag.* 27. That what he gives *is a plain and true Account of theſe Negociations.* The Hiſtory of Don *Quixote* bears the Title of a True one, and ſo do many other Books of that Sort, which yet gives them never the better Authority.

I am very ſenſible, the Author of the Letters, and all his Adherents, ſhould they ſee what I am now Writing, would not fail to ſet me off with all the Titles of Jacobite, Papiſt, Favourer of the *French*, and many of a full groſſer Nature, if any ſuch may be found; and yet in ſpight of all their Courteſie, can I not forbear taking Notice, with what earneſtneſs he preſſes King *Philip*'s holding of *Spain* to be a violent Uſurpation, and well known to be ſuch both to his Grandfather and himſelf. I ſhall not pretend to aſſert his Title, but methinks this Author has the leaſt reaſon in the World to oppoſe it. 'Tis his, and the Doctrine of his Friends, That all Power is originally in the People, who have the Right of making and

and unmaking of Kings, as they ſee expedient and for their publick Good. Now this King *Philip*, or this Duke of *Anjou*, it is moſt evident was call'd in, receiv'd, and is ſupported by the People of *Spain*, who have moſt ſignally ſhown their Zeal for, and Affection to him in the greateſt Trials; ſo that if the whole Right of diſpoſing of Crowns be in the People, he ſeems to ſtand as fair for it as any Man. Thus much I have offer'd to ſhow how inconſiſtent ſome Men are with themſelves; for if the People of *England* have ſuch a Right, as has been ſufficiently inculcated of late, it may be rationally ſuppos'd, that the People of all other Nations have the ſame, unleſs he will make out that theSovereignty of theUniverſe is in the People of *England*,and that they only have the Authority of chooſing Kings for themſelves and for all other Nations. And now to evince how little I think this Argument makes for the Right of King *Philip* or Duke of *Anjou*, I do poſitively declare it to be my Opinion, That if he has no better Right than what he derives from the People, that is as little as the Letter-Writer can wiſh him. That Query is follow'd by others as impertinent, *viz. Is it not kept plainly for the Uſe and Benefit of the Giver? Has not the Giver Power to take it from him, &c.* He very well knows the Anſwer muſt be Negative; and we have told him, the *Spaniards* accepting of the Second Grandſon is a Demonſtration they never intended it for the uſe of the Grandfather, and they would rather call in all

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the Allies to their Aſſiſtance, than be impos'd upon in that Point; and to ſay, the Giver has Power to take, has been before made out to be ridiculous; and whatſoever plauſible Colour he endeavours to put on it, I cannot believe all the Artifice in the World can ever perſuade a Grandfather to be himſelf the Ruin of his Grandſon.

Next follows an almoſt inextricable Knot of Queries and Suppoſitions, which all tend to make out, That the having a Peace with *France* would no way forward the Reduction of *Spain*, and the *French* giving up of ſtrong Towns would be no Advantage to us; which is ſo wild and extravagant a Notion, as none but himſelf could be guilty of. Juſt before we were told, That the Duke of *Anjou* could not hold *Spain* unleſs ſupported by his Grandfather; and now, the leaving of him to himſelf, or only affording him ſome private Supplies of Money, and ſome few Men by way Deſertion, makes the Matter more difficult than ever it was, when he employ'd his whole Power to maintain him in the Throne. He would perſuade us we ſhould be nothing the better for having ſeveral ſtrong Towns put into our Hands by way of Treaty, and yet the taking of thoſe ſame Places by force, at an immenſe Expence of Treaſure, and with the Loſs of many Thouſand Lives, is of the greateſt Moment; ſo that to have the ſame Places for nothing is not ſo Beneficial as when dearly Bought. This is ſtrong Reaſoning, and yet not all; for if

thoſe

thoſe Towns were given, *Holland* would be ſo full of Care for its new Frontier, that it would not attend the War. I would gladly know of him, How they provide for thoſe Places now they are gain'd by Conqueſt, and yet purſue the War? Would it not be eaſier for them to ſecure that Barrier when they had no Enemy to fear on that ſide, than it is now they have every Year a potent Army againſt them in the Field. But then ſuppoſe, ſays he, The Duke of *Savoy*, or King of *Pruſſia*, fall off from the Grand Alliance; and the very next Period, ſuppoſe they do not fall of, take it which way you will, *We ſhall have no War on the* Rhine, *or in* Savoy, *when Peace is made, when the Articles of the Treaty have been all executed, and there is no more Enemy to moleſt them, no Cauſe of Complaint, or Pretence for a new Campaign left.* Can any Thing be more abſurd than what this Man peſters the World with? To what purpoſe is all this Rhapſody, Would he have the Allies make War in *Savoy*, and on the *Rhine*, againſt no Enemy, when they have had all they demanded? I cannot dive into the meaning of this Jargon, unleſs it be that he is troubled to think the Allies, when they had made a Peace with *France*, and got all they could by Treaty, would not then fall upon that King by ſurprize, and ſtrip him of what little he had left. If he does not mean this, he means nothing, for to make War after a Peace concluded, and all Articles perform'd, can have no other meaning.

Pag.

Pag. 38. *If they* (the *French*) *make a Peace, they may disband* 60 *or* 80000 *Men, or more; and what ſhall hinder theſe Men from going into* Spain *to ſeek their Bread?* Were this Gentleman willing to remember what he writes, he might eaſily call to Mind he had before anſwer'd this Queſtion himſelf, in his firſt Letter of *The Management of the War, Pag.* 25. where he told us, That Spain *is not able to ſupport its own Inhabitants, much leſs an Army of Foreign Troops*; and his Propoſal there was but for 20000 Men. If the Caſe be ſo, Why does he now with ſuch Eaſe ſend 60 *or* 80000 *to ſeek their Bread*, where he ſays there is none, or not enough to ſubſiſt the Natives. This looks like a Contrivance to deſtroy ſo many thouſand *French* without fighting; or elſe he ſuppoſes, the *French*, who are ſo much nearer *Spain* than we, are not let into the Secret, that there is no Subſiſtance for them there; and if it be ſo, ſtill this mighty Army will be able to do the *Spaniards* no other Service, than to help them to Starve the ſooner. This muſt be a neceſſary Conſequence, if what he aſſerted in the Place above-mention'd were true; but if theſe Men could ſubſiſt, then has he deſtroy'd all the Reputation of his ſaid firſt Letter, and the carrying on the War in *Spain* is not ſo impracticable as he would there repreſent it. Let him take which Handle he pleaſes, he will find himſelf at a Loſs to reconcile theſe Contradictions, and all Men will ſee how groſly he endeavours to impoſe on them. It is a true ſaying, That thoſe who

would Deceive others with Untruths ought to have good Memories, leſt they be catch'd Tripping, and then all their Forgeries fall to the Ground.

Pag. 42. repeats the ſame Nonſenſe above taken Notice of, which is, requiring a greater Army and Expence for maintaining the Towns given up by Treaty, in time of Peace, than for keeping them, and extending our Conqueſts in Time of War: His Words are theſe; *Nay, conſidering the Number of Towns given up to the Allies, which all muſt have Gariſons in them, and thoſe not very ſmall Ones, to keep their new Subjects in Awe, we ſhould want a greater Army in* Flanders *than before, to be in a Condition to Act offenſively.* There has been more taken than ever the *French* offer'd to give, as he owns himſelf, *Pag.* 43. where he ſays, they always excepted *Doway.* Why then is it ſo much eaſier to keep more Towns taken by Force than fewer ſurrendred by Treaty. It is amazing, that Men, who pretend to Politicks, ſhould publiſh ſuch undigeſted Fancies, without conſidering how much they expoſe themſelves to the Scorn and Laughter of all Creatures that can diſtinguiſh betwixt Senſe and Nonſenſe.

Now for Strength of Argument, *Pag.* 44. *Now ſuppoſe the Allies would have departed from it,* (the 37th Article) *could he* (the *French* Miniſter) *have ſign'd the reſt?* *No.* Poſitively anſwer'd; and I may with better Reaſon ask him, Did Monſieur *Rouille* ever tell you he could not, or communicate his Powers to you? and Anſwer my ſelf

with much better Authority, No. For moſt certain it is he did not; and then how ſhould this Man be able ſo readily to put in the Negative for him? Then the reſt of his Proof is, *We may eaſily gueſs; 'tis probable; who knows; ſuppoſing*: Wonderful convincing! And after all this gueſs Work; then for the Poſitive again; *The firſt Thing to be done was the Surrendering of* Mons, Namur, *and* Charleroy——— *but we are ſure it would not have been done at all.* This Man is certainly a Prodigy, either of Infatuation, or Aſſurance, or both; for I cannot find we are ſure of any Thing that depends upon the Will of another; unleſs we allow him that Infallibility which he will not allow the Sovereign. Then for Politicks; *It is the Opinion of ſome knowing Men, that the Conceſſions* France *has ſeem'd to make in other Articles, were never intended to be executed.* Theſe knowing Men, we may, as he does in other Caſes, ſuppoſe, are himſelf and his Gang; for the generality of Mankind are not ſo ſharp and quick-ſighted, or perhaps, not ſo raſh in their Judgments.

To conclude the firſt Letter, the Author tells us, *Page* 48, that is, the beſt Account he can ſend his Friend, who he flatters himſelf will be content with it, conſidering the Secrecy with which Affairs of this Nature are, or ought to be tranſacted. Conſidering that Secreſie he talks of, I ſay, neither his Correſpondent, nor any other rational Man, can have Cauſe to believe one Word of what he has ſaid; for as a

Secret he could know nothing of it, and as no Secret, all that was not such has been long since made Publick. Thus let his first Letter go for a Romance, which is the best Name we can give it, and indeed, but a very poor One, that we may proceed to the Second.

But before we part with this, one Word to the Postscript, a Piece so shameful, that it has out-done all the Contents of the Three Letters, and yet there is foul Language enough in them; but here in Nineteen short Lines of an *Octavo* Page we have a Collection of *Billingsgate* Discourse, more becoming an Oyster-Woman than a Reverend Author. In that short compass, the *Examiner* is dubb'd a prostitute Writer, a mercenary Scribler, an Insolent, a Libeller, and almost a Villain. He has given the Answer such filth deserves in *Examiner*, *N.* 29. and it is needless for me to undertake the Cause of a Person so much abler than my self. Yet I cannot but take Notice of the most unreasonable Pretence on which the *Negociator* lets fly so much Dirt at the *Examiner*, which, as he tells us, is for calling the Duke of *M*———, *A Catiline at the Head of a mercenary Army*. The Words indeed are in the Paper quoted, that is, the *Examiner*, *N.* 4. but the Application is certainly the proper Thought of the Author of the Postscript, who certainly deserves all the Reward the Law can bestow on such as Slander great Men; for to adapt base Characters, at so vast a Distance, to any peculiar Persons, is the worst of Defamation;

mation; and could it have enter'd into the *Examiner*'s Thoughts, to have aim'd that at the D. of *M——bro*, of whom I always find him ſpeaking with the greateſt Honour and Reſpect, the other muſt have been ſtill more Criminal for uttering that ſo plain, which might have otherwiſe been unperceiv'd by the greater Part of Mankind. I have often ſhewn this Writer dives into the moſt ſecret Receſſes of human Hearts, to fetch out their moſt private Thoughts and Deſigns; it is therefore no wonder he ſhould be ſo well acquainted with the Meaning of the *Examiner*, who can tell us whatſoever is tranſacted in the cloſeſt Conferences, and what is intended by the Allies, and by their Enemies.

We come now to the laſt Letter, which is divided into three Parts; the firſt, From Monſieur *Rouille*'s return to Monſieur *Petkum*'s Journey to *Paris*; the ſecond, From that Time to the Arrival of the *French* Plenipotentiaries at *Gertruydenberg*; and the laſt, During their ſtay there. Moſt of this Letter is Narrative, either of True, or Suppoſititious Facts, which I cannot pretend to be ſo intelligent in thoſe Affairs as to diſprove, and therefore ſhall be the more brief, as keeping cloſe to my Method all along; that is, not to make my ſelf more knowing in Secrets than I am, nor preſume to Cenſure or Judge of thoſe entruſted in the Government; but only to expoſe the Weakneſs and Incongruity of theſe ſo much applauded Letters. Beſides, in this laſt, there is ſo much of the ſame, or ſo very like the Matter of the others, that to be particular to many Points of it, would of neceſſity require Repetition, and conſequently be Impertinent rather than Entertaining.

The Letter then begins, *Pag.* 2. with the Offer made by *France*, *That the King ſhould not directly*

nor

nor indirectly assist his Grandson: Pursuant to this *Pag.* 4. he withdraws all his Forces out of *Spain*. This, any indifferent Person, who could not see into the Hearts of Men, would have thought look'd like a Disposition towards performing what was offer'd; but our sharp-sighted Author perceives it was just the contrary, and assures us, it was only to disable himself from delivering up any cautionary Towns in *Spain* if they had been demanded. Thus it appears, That whatsoever that Prince designs is discover'd by the wonderful Sagacity of this Writer: If the *Spaniards* act vigorously whilst a Treaty is a-foot in *Flanders*, that shows the *French* never intend to perform what is propos'd; if they withdraw their Forces, that is, because they will not deliver up the strong Towns. So that whether they have Troops in *Spain*, or no Troops, they are still in the wrong. Nor is this all, we shall find it a difficult Task to understand by the Account here given, whether he withdrew, or did not withdraw; for *Pag.* 4. says, *He withdrew his Troops out of the Kingdom, yet kept them there all the Summer to be at hand to assist the Duke of* Anjou; so they were there and not there, they were to assist the Duke of *Anjou*, and yet the Marshal *Bezons* being expostulated with for not assisting him, produc'd the King's Orders to justifie himself. Nay, this is not all, we were told, *Pag.* 6. That the *French* King withdrew his Troops out of *Spain* to make his own People and the Allies believe he was sincerely for Peace; and the very next Lines inform us he wanted those Troops in *Flanders*, which implies something more than Pretence and Sham. But here is a whole Chain of Contradictions; for tho' that King wanted his Troops in *Flanders*, *he contriv'd as many of them should desert as would make* 7 *or* 8 *Batallions, and sent all the* Walloon *Regiments out of* Flanders

into Spain. He wanted his Troops, and made them Desert, and sent others in the Place of those that did not Desert: Let any Man read the Letter and judge, whether it be possible to pick Sense out of this Medley; and yet so blind is Prepossession, That such a huddle of Confusion is applauded and cry'd up as irresistible Argument. And to confirm the want of these Troops in *Flanders*, many of them that were so withdrawn were kept in *Rousillon*, to be ready to return to *Spain*.

Pag. 7. and 8. *The next best Expedient was to put into the Hands of the Allies some* French *Towns on the Frontier of* Spain, *such as* Bayonne *and* Perpignan, *which would have enabled the Allies to send Forces to* Spain *with infinitely less Expence and Trouble, and in a quarter of the Time they can now.* The *French* answer, *That it did not Suit either with the Safety or Dignity of* France *to put the Keys of the Kingdom into the Hands of the Allies*, &c. Surely, this cannot be thought a very unreasonable Answer; but whatsoever may be thought of that, let us see, how much this Project of the Author's would facilitate the Conquest of *Spain*, which we were before told could not maintain an Army, nor furnish Mules to carry Provisions. We must suppose the Forces to be landed at *Bayonne*, and whither must they March next? If into *Biscay*, that is the barrenest, poorest, and most mountainous Part of *Spain*, then what will become of them, when we are told, they cannot live in the best: If into *Navarre*, that is not much better than the other, and they must pass the *Pyreneans*. For *Arragon*, the same Mountains are in the Way, and so all along the Frontier. And what was to be done with *Perpignan*. If it was propos'd to go thither by Sea, that is farther off than *Barcelona*. If by Land, from *Bayonne* the March

is about 80 Leagues all through *France*; ſo that the *French* muſt not only give up thoſe two Towns, but all the Country between them; and when there, our Forces have more Difficulties to ſurmount than from *Barcelona*. Theſe Blunders, our Letter-Writer is ſo far from regarding, that he goes on in his old Way of contradicting himſelf, at *Pag.* 9. where after, anſwering for the Allies, That they would certainly reſtore thoſe Towns as ſoon as their Buſineſs were done, he adds, They could not be able to keep them; becauſe, *If the Allies had never ſo much Juſtice on their ſide, they could not long ſupport themſelves under the mighty Diſadvantages with which they muſt make War on this Frontier; of which you may judge by what I have ſaid in my firſt Letter, which with little Alteration, will hold here.* Juſt before, the Delivery of thoſe Towns made all Things eaſie for the reducing of *Spain*; and now, all on a ſudden, the Allies cannot be able to ſupport themſelves in them under the mighty Diſadvantages mention'd in his firſt Letter. Saying and Unſaying is his common Practice; he allows his Reader no Memory or Senſe to put theſe Things together. When a Thing makes for his Turn, nothing is more eaſie, when the ſame is againſt him, it is altogether impracticable.

We will paſs by the Author's airy Notions of cautionary Places in *Alſace* and *Flanders*, his Bundle of Queries, *Pag.* 12. and 13. his Reflections on the Battel of *Taniers*, *pag.* 14. his Apprehenſions of the *French* Miniſters, poiſoning the Minds of the People againſt their Governours, *pag.* 14. his thorough Knowledge of the Letters written by Count *Bergheyck* and Monſieur *Torcy*, to the D. of *M.* and abundance more of the like Stamp; for I muſt draw to a Concluſion, yet cannot but obſerve, *pag.* 20. will have the *Fundamental Arti-*

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cles, not only agreed on, but executed, before the general Treaty is concluded. This is indeed a new Way of treating, it is knocing a Man down firſt, and when your Foot is upon his Belly, admitting him to Parley; it is hanging of him firſt and then trying him afterwards. What Mortal ever heard that a Treaty ſhould be executed before it is concluded? How much fitter, were this Perſon, who abounds in ſuch profound Expedients to be a Plenipotentiary than a Chaplain? What would not the *French* give to gain ſuch a thorough pac'd Politician, to manage their Treaties for them, and keep their Secrets; for what can be more ſurprizing than what he tells us, *Pag.* 21. *Mr.* Ibberville *was ſent to* Madrid, *where he communicated his Buſineſs to none but the King himſelf, and no Judgment could be made what his Errand was*; yet this Sage of ours, from whom nothing can be conceal'd, by meer Strength of Reaſon, has found, *it was to learn the State the Duke's Affairs were in, and give him his Leſſon how to manage, with Aſſurances that his Grandfather would never forſake him.* What more could he have told us, had he made a third Man with Mr. *Ibberville* and King *Philip*, for he vouchſafes in this Place to call him King, and but 8 Lines after unkings and dubs him Duke again.

Pag. 22. To give the World a ſmall Specimen of his good Nature, as he has done ſo many of his Abilities, he ſays, *If this King* (of *France*) *were not a perfect Maſter in all Arts and Methods of Deceit, as great an Enemy as he is, I ſhould be almoſt tempted to pity him, to ſee how hard a Game he has to play.* Prodigious Exceſs of Generoſity, that he could almoſt be tempted to pity him. What greater Calamity could the moſt inplacable of his Enemies wiſh that Monarch, than to ſee him reduc'd ſo low as to be pity'd by ſo inconſiderable a Creature?

Pag. 26. takes Notice of the *French* King's giving the Title of Duke of *Anjou* to the D. of *Burgundy*'s Second Son, *which was an Indication, he reſolv'd to inſiſt upon his Grandſon's having the Title of King* Philip *given*

ven him in the next Conferences, &c. —— *If therefore the Name of King was to remain to him, 'twas intended a Kingdom ſhould do ſo to.* I cannot conceive why any Myſtery ſhould be made of this Affair, by one who is ſo particularly inform'd in every Point relating to the Conferences, when all the World has ſeen, in the Poſt-ſcript to the *Poſt-Man, July* 25. 1710. *The Extract from the Regiſter of the Reſolutions of the* States General, on *Wedneſday, July* 23. 1710. wherein mention is ſeveral times made of a Partition, and of giving *Sicily* and *Sardinia* to King *Philip*, which ſeems never to have been rejected by the *Dutch*, who only inſiſted upon having *Spain* and the *Weſt-Indies* put into the Hands of King *Charles* by the *French*, in caſe that Partition were agreed on. The *Negociator*, who traces every private Step of theſe Affairs, might have taken Notice of one ſo publick as this, to ſave making ſo much Noiſe about the Title of Duke of *Anjou*, which the Grandfather might well beſtow on another, when no Objection was made againſt leaving his Grandſon King of *Sicily* and *Sardinia*, if he were depriv'd of *Spain* and the *Weſt-Indies*. I ſuppoſe, this Gentleman had not conſented that King *Philip* ſhould have *Sicily* and *Sardinia*, and therefore takes no Notice of that Compliance of the *Dutch*, ſo far at leaſt as not to reject it entirely, till ſome Pages after, when he comes to the Conferences; and to ſhew us ſomething of his Authority, *pag.* 29. he declares, *That thoſe Conferences laſted more Weeks than they ſhould have been ſuffered to do Days*; by which he ſets himſelf up as ſole Arbitrator of what ought to have been done, and condemns the Conduct of the States, who permitted it, and of all the other Miniſters, who in all likelihood were conſenting to it. Had any of thoſe, who have incurr'd his Diſpleaſure, and are dignify'd by him with the Titles of, proſtitute Wretches, mercenary Scriblers, Libellers, *&c.* preſum'd thus to preſcribe, how long the Conferences were to laſt, what a Clamour would this Author have rais'd againſt him? The leaſt he could expect would

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be to find himself expos'd to the Mercy of the Multitude under those agreeable Titles of *Jacobite*, Non-Juror, *French*-Pensioner, and others, tho' not more dangerous of a far grosser Nature. But all Things are lawful to the Saints, and one Man may better Steal a Horse than another look over the Hedge. It is the peculiar Priviledge of some to rail and find Faults with whom they please, the twentieth Part of which in others is an unpardonable Offence.

It is high time to hasten to a Conclusion, since I am not writing a Volume, which might be fill'd up, were I to take Notice of half the Contradictions and Absurdities these Letters are stuff'd with. Many following Pages are taken up with the Author's wise Observations upon the Conferences, and the Possibility or Impossibility of concluding a good Peace with *France*, which is all along treated by him with such Language, that a Man who had not heard the contrary, would be apt to believe it had been writ by some Porter, or as the *Examiner* observes of the Postscript, by *some Footman he had pick'd up among the Boys that follow the Camp, whose Character it would fit much better than that of the suppos'd Author*. And with him we may further say, *When he turns off his Footman*, we may see *how far the rest deserves to be consider'd*. The best Words he can bestow are, *The worst of Enemies, the basest, falsest, most trickish, most perfidious Court under Heaven*, and much more to the same effect, much below the Dignity of the Canonical Gown; and scarce tolerable from the Mouth of the most inconsiderable wretched Pettifoger. These, it must be allow'd, are Terms agreeable enough to the Rabble, if he writ, as we have Reason to imagine, only for them; but, if he had intended to be read by Gentlemen, he should have kept within the Bounds of good Manners, for fear of offending their Ears with such disagreeable Sounds. Besides, such mean malicious Bitterness, should not be heard from the Mouth, or read from the Pen, of those who ought to be all Charity, and rather to pray that

God would turn the Hearts of thoſe they think ſo wicked, than to exert their Talent in reviling. If his own Profeſſion had fail'd of inſtructing him, he might have learnt in the Army, that it is the Part of Men of Honour to treat their Enemies with Civility.

He makes much Noiſe about the *French propoſing a Partition as an Expedient* for a Peace; as if he had never heard himſelf of a Partition actually agreed upon before the War; and poſitively affirms, the *Dutch* would conſent to nothing without full Satisfaction given to all the Allies, ſome of which *were utterly averſe to a Partition of any kind.* He would do well now to inform us, to what End they treated upon that Expedient; for if they knew the Allies would not hear of it, and they were reſolv'd not to conclude any Thing without them, there was not the leaſt Occaſion for any Conference upon that footing. Then he is very angry, the *French* ſhould require them to *make no farther Demands, after the Execution of the Preliminaries, than what were already contain'd in the Articles, or ſhould be then declar'd.* This I believe, to moſt rational Men, can ſeem no extravagant Requeſt; ſince, to give up ſtrong Towns, and perform other Covenants, before they knew what was to be farther demanded, could not ſeem ſuitable with common Diſcretion; and it is not to be doubted, but that, had they done it, this ſame Gentleman, would have repreſented them as much Fools, as he now labours to make them Knaves. It is uſual to oblige Perſons, whoſe Integrity is ſuſpected, to give Security for Performance of ſuch Covenants as are before agreed on; but I believe it was never heard, that any Man ſhould give Security to perform all that ſhall be demanded of him after ſuch Security given. I cannot think any ſuch Thing could be offer'd in the Conferences, or it muſt have been in another Nature; for ſure none but ſuch a *Negociator* would think of impoſing ſuch hard Terms upon a Monarch.

Pag. 50. *The Grand Project of a Universal Monarchy is now upon the Point of being finish'd or destroy'd.* This Project is a meer Chimera as all the rest of this Author's Informations, a Notion so far from being probable, that it seems altogether impossible, and if ever any Nation could dream of it, they must be thought to be under a perfect Infatuation. Most Princes I beleive are willing enough to extend their Dominions, yet all of them too plainly see with how jealous an Eye their Neighbours look upon the least Increase of their Power, to entertain any Thoughts of rendring it Universal. The *Romans* indeed stretch'd out their Conquests very far, but that was in a Time of Barbarity, when every Nation stood upon its own Feet, and depended on its Strength; the Case is now alter'd, and every one endeavours to support it self, with the Assistance not only of the neareſt, but even of the remotest. All join to crush the prevailing Kingdom. This was done when the House of *Austria* seem'd to be uppermost, and the same has been ever practis'd since that of *Bourbon* began to grow formidable. Besides the Way for *France* to have aim'd at this imaginary Universal Monarchy had been to reject the Offer of *Spain* made to *Philip* and to insist on it for the Duke of *Burgundy*, in whom the two Monarchies had been really united, and that might have been a considerable Advance towards the incorporating of others by Degrees. But to call that an Uniting of the two Crowns, because they are on the Heads of two Brothers is no more likely, than that every younger Brother should submit his Estate to the Disposal of the Elder, which I think is so far from being practis'd, that I am of Opinion there are but few who would not rather take from another, than part with any thing of their own. And it is well known that the *Spanish* Nation accepted of *Philip* on that very Principle, which was to prevent ever falling under the Dominion of *France*, or is it in the least to be question'd but that the said *Philip* will to the utmost of

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his Power, defend what he has got, againſt Brother or Father, ſhould they attempt to give Laws to him, and ſhould he find himſelf too weak to oppoſe them, will not fail to crave the Aſſiſtance of all the Powers of *Europe*.

Next follows, to paſs by the *Munſter* Story as too remote from us, a ſevere Invective againſt *ſome Men*, Pag. 53 and 54. *Who had Work to be done which could not be carried on without a Peace*; —— *and 'twas much to their Purpoſe to have a Ferment in the Nation; and nothing can ſave the Nation from the Dangers ſome Men would bring it into*, &c. Here are mighty Innuendo's, a great Cry and little Wool. Nay this is putting the Nation into a Ferment, to tell them of ſuch pernicious Men, and ſuch imminent Dangers, which no Man knows of but himſelf. If he knows of ſuch Men it is his Duty to diſcover them, that ſo the Dangers may be prevented, or he will be as guilty as the Actors; or if he knows not, why does he endeavour to cauſe Diſtractions by the Apprehenſion of imaginary Perils.

How inſupportable is the Conceitedneſs of this Writer all along, and again p. 57. where he impoſes his ſtrange Fancies on the Reader, with *'Tis probable the* French *Miniſters either* Blecour *or* Ibberville, *or ſome other of their Emiſſaries had pretended to treat with ſome of the Grandees*, and for what? But to try whether they would abandon their King, and this Trick we muſt believe is *extremely probable, and poſſibly they went further, and that in Concert with the* French, *to ſave the King's Honour they agreed to ſeize his Perſon and carry him off*. What a ſhameful Story is here rais'd upon the bare Credit of *it is probable and poſſibly*, without the leaſt Ground for this extravagant Poſſibility and Probability, but that the Duke of *Medina Celi* was ſeiz'd for a Deſign againſt the King. And this Practice for ought he knows was carried on by *Blecour*, or *Ibberville*, or any body elſe, for he neither knows nor cares, ſo his idle Suppoſition may but inculcate ſomething.

I am so weary of speaking to these Absurdities that I must beg your Lordship's Pardon for leaving off perhaps something abruptly, for no Patience can enable a Man to dwell so long upon so ungrateful a Subject. Yet before I conclue, I must take Notice of his Expressions *Pag.* 64. which I think are not only groundless, but audacious; for there speaking of the D. of *M.* he says he is afraid he cannot do so much, because *the Enemies are encourag'd, the Allies full of Jealousies and Fears, and himself extremely mortify'd, uneasy in his Thoughts, undermin'd in the Favour of his Sovereign, vilely misrepresented to the People, without Interest at home, without Authority in the Army*, with much more of this shameless Bombast, so scandalous that there is no need of making any Reflection on it. Then *Pag.* 66. *What Villany was it to try by Lies and Calumnies to ruin him, who could not sink without drawing the Ruin of the Nation along with him.* This Expression alone sufficiently exposes the Author's Folly, to say no worse, in that he hangs the Fate of the Nation upon so small a Thread as the Life or Grandeur of a Single Person, which as it is the highest piece of Flattery on the one Hand, so it is no less a Slander and Reproach upon all deserving Men on the other.

I was before tir'd, but this I must confess has somewhat provok'd me, for after all he has rail'd against encouraging our Enemies, I think nothing could have been said more effectual that way, than to tell the World there is but one single Man between us and Ruin. I will therefore rid my Hands of this Writer at once, begging Pardon for having been so tedious, and subscribe my self

Your Lordship's

Most Obedient Servant.

Lingua mali pars peſſima ſervi. Juvenal, Sat. 9.

A Paper being ſent me, call'd, *An Anſwer to the Examination of the Management of the War*, by the *Medley*'s Footman, I read it at the farther end of the Yard, where it could be put to the proper Uſe. As for the Author, he might have ſpar'd giving us his Title, which any Man might have gueſs'd at by his Style. When the Slaves rebell'd againſt the Ancient *Scythians*, their Maſters laid down their Arms, and attack'd them with Laſhes. The proper Reply to a foul-mouth'd Footman is a Cudgel, or a Horſe-Whip. There are Footmen who have Senſe and Manners; but this ſeems to be the ſame Fellow the *Examiner* told us, the Manager had pick'd up in the Army; who being there us'd to marauding, in *Engliſh*, filching, has ſtolen ſome of his Maſter's Notes to patch up a ſcurvy Sheet for the Preſs; unleſs we will believe the Maſter and the Man are the ſame, which muſt be ſo, if we may credit this Writer; becauſe he tells us, the Letter-Writer, in a Poſtſcript, recommended himſelf to his Protection; but that was to the Protection of the *Medley*, and not of his Footman; which is a Demonſtration, that the Two pretended Perſons are the ſame; and thus we ſee the Man is the Maſter, and *vice verſa*. He concludes, He has condeſcended thus far to protect the *Letter-Writer*; the Condeſcenſion and Protection of a Footman are very ſingular and honourable. It is more like Impudence in a Fellow, who owns that Poſt, to call the *Examiner* by the familiar Name of his Friend; but it is natural for ſuch as have been almoſt naked, to be Saucy, when they get into a new Livery; I ſhall therefore take no more Notice of him, any farther, than to commit him, if he preſumes to Scribble again, to the Correction of the Beadle.

FINIS.